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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
MARYLAND CASUALTY CO ....... . Plaintiff in Error 
. v. 
CLIFTON TONEY, ET ALS ....... Defendants-in-Error 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR ON BEHALF OF 
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 
To the Honorable Chief Just-ice and Justices of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Maryland Casualty Company, represents 
• that it is aggrieved by a final judgment rendered against 
it by the Circuit Court of Alleghany County on the 12th 
day of August, 1940, in a garnishment proceeding 
2* therein pending wherein your *petitioner was gar-
nishee, E. G. Kelly and Carl Blankenship were the 
execution debtors, and Clifton Toney was the plaintiff. 
A duly certified copy of the transcript of the record is 
herewith filed and references here~n are to the manuscript 
record. . 
Your petitioner is advised and represents that said judg-
ment against it is erroneous and that it is aggrieved thereby 
in the following particulars, namely: 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. 
The court erred in overruling the motions of the petitioner 
that the plaintiff's evidence· be striken, the first of said 
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motions made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence 
and the ·second of said motions being made at the conclusion 
of all the· evidence. 
2. 
The court erred m granting instructions A-1, A, B, C, 
and D. 
3. 
The court erred in refusing to give instructions 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 offered by petitioner. 
4. 
The court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict as 
being contrary to the law and evidence and entering judg-
ment for the petitioner. 
*5 
The court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict • 
c.md granting a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Uncontradicted Facts 
In an action at law by Clifton Toney, plaintiff, against 
E. G. Kelly and Carl Blankenship, defendants, to recover 
damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff on February 
1.i, 1939, in an automobile accident, a judgment for $12,-
000.00 and costs was rendered against E. G. Kelley, the owner 
e,f the Dodge automobile involved in the accident, and Carl 
Blankenship, the driver of the Dodge car. Thereafter a sum-
mons on suggestion vms issued at the direction of Clifton 
Toney against the judgment debtors and Maryland Casualty 
Company as garnishee, and the latter in due time filed its 
answer to said summons on suggestion denying any in-
debtedness to the judgment debtors or that it had control 
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or possession of any property or effects of the judgment 
debtors. 
The judgment creditor claimed that Maryland Casualty 
Company was liable to the extent of $10,000.00 by reason 
of an automobile liability insurance policy issued by it to 
E. G. Kelley on April 9, 1938, covering a Ford automobile. 
rfhe Maryland Casualty Company shortly after the accident 
occurred advised Kelley that it would not take any part 
in the defense of any action by Toney to recover for 
4* his injuries, and denied any liability by reason of *the 
policy of insurance. Accordingly, the insurance com-
pany refused to participate in the defense of the action for. 
damages. The insurance company, as garnishee, interposed 
_the defense that it was in no wise liable under the policy. 
T'he trial court, hovvcver, rendered the judgment by which 
the ·insurance company is aggrieved. 
E. G. Kelley owned a Ford automobile described in the· 
policy of insurance. Some time prior to January 31, 1940, 
he sought to trade the Ford car to Wood-Hammond Chevrolet 
· Compa,ny of Clifton Forge, for a new Chevrolet, but Kelley 
was not satisfied with the trade-in allowance offered for the 
Ford. He then told vVood, with whom he was negotiating, 
that he (Kelley) was "on a deal for a Dodge" and Wood said 
to him: "go ahead and trade for that Dodge, and I could 
probably give him a better proposition then" (page 65). 
On January 31, 1939, Kelley traded to Fulton Motor 
Company, of Roanoke, the Ford for a Dodge, the latter car 
being delivered on that day to Kelley in Roanoke, all neces-
sary papers being then and there executed and endorsed, there-
by vesting title and ownership of the Dodge in Kelley (pages 
31, 51, 52 and 64). 
Wood did not see the Dodge before Kelley traded the 
Ford for it, and the first time Wood saw the Dodge was at 
Kelley's home in Clifton Forge after Kelley had become 
the owner thereof ( pages 33 and 66). 
On February 4, 1939, an agreement was entered into 
whereby Kelley agreed to trade the Dodge to Wood-Ham-
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.tt1ond Chevrolet Company for a new Chevrolet, which was 
nothing more that a pref erred delivery order ( pages 
66, 67 and 72), which order was later cancelled * (page 
73), when it developed that Wood would not be able 
to deliver a new Chevrolet of the kind and type Kelley 
desired ( page 340). 
On the strength of the delivery order the Dodge was 
delivered to Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company, but Kelley 
was privileged to use the Dodge pending the consummation 
of a trade of the Dodge for a Chevrolet (pages 74 and 75). 
During the time the Dodge was in the possession of Wood-
. Hammond Chevrolet Company Kelley kept the for hire tags 
he had removed from the Ford car on the Dodge (pages 76 
and 80). And while Kelley was using the Dodge, and after 
its delivery to the Chevrolet company, Wood talked to Kelley 
about using the Dodge in taxi service, and on about Febru-
ary?, 1939, caused the Dodge to be returned to the company 
(page~ 74·, 75 and 79). 
No certificate of title to the Dodge was ever issued or 
assign·ed to Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company (pages 
80 and 81). 
For hire tags and taxi signs were on the Ford when traded 
to Fulton Motor Company. Before the accident taxi signs 
were painted on the Dodge by Kelley and for hire tags used 
thereon (pages 104 and 105). 
While the Dodge was in Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Com-
pany's possession the company did a little work on it, valued 
at $3.00 or $4.00, which was paid for by Kelley (pages 340 
and 35). 
The Dodge car was driven by Blankenship on February 
17, 1939, ( the date of the accident) to get repair parts there-
for ( page 82). It was not transporting passengers for 
hire at the time. 
The insurance company had no notice or knowledge that 
the Ford car had been traded for the Dodge until after the 
6* 
accident (page 98), and it was then represented to the 
insurance *company's agent on the day of ·the ac-
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cident by Kelley that he had gotten the Dodge the night be-
fore ( page 98). 
Kelley reported the accident to the local insurance agent 
on February 17th, and an investigator for the insurance com-
pany began his investigation February 1_8th. By letter, 
dated March 14, 1939, Kelley was advised by the insurance 
company that it was not liable ( pages 45 and 46) . 
The time interyening between the date of the accident and 
the notice to Kelley that t~e Dodge was not covered by the 
policy is explained on pages 100 and 115 of the record. 
Kelley owned other cars upon which he carried liability 
insura_nce with another insurance company. Insurance rates 
on taxis are higher than on cars used for private business 
and pleasure. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
The plaintiff contends that the Ford car and Dodge car 
were never used in the taxi business. Direct , testimony · by 
Kelley and Blankenship so showed. The insurance com-
pany · sought to show by circumstantial evidence that the 
Ford and Dodge should be classified as taxis. Kelley testi-
fied that they were held in readiness for emergency service as 
taxis, and it was his intention should such an emergency 
arise to cancel his policy with the Maryland Casualty Com-
pany and switch insurance to another company (page 57). 
The fact that Kelley kept for hire tags and taxi signs on both 
cars is another circumstance showing that the cars should 
be classified as taxis. 
7* *POSITION OF MARYLAND CASUALTY 
COMPANY· 
The petitioner contends that the Dodge cat was not covered 
by the insurance policy on February 17, 1939, the date of 
the accident. 
First, because more that ten days had elapsed from the 
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time of the delivery of the Dodge to Kelley by Fulton Motor 
Company and the date of the accident, without notice of 
such delivery having been given to the petitioner as required 
by the policy of insurance; and 
Secondly, because the Dodge could not be classified for 
the purpose of use as stated in the policy, to-wit: "pleasure 
and business, excluding the carrying of passengers for a 
consideration." 
POSITION OF THE PLAINTIFF 
The plaintiff contends that the interval of time between 
February 4, 1939, the date the contract between Kelley and 
Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company was executed, and 
February 13, 1939, when the contract was cancelled, should 
not be considered in computing the ten days within which 
notice should have been given under the terms of the policy 
when another car replaced the car described in the policy; 
and the plaintiff also contends that Kelley did not become 
the O'wner of the Dodge until February 13, 1939. 
8* *ARGUMENT 
EACH MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EVI-
DENCE SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUSTAINED 
The policy ( Insuring Agreement III) provides automatic 
ins~rance for newly acquired automobiles as follows: 
"If the named insured ·who is the owner of the automobile 
acquires ovmership of another automobile, such insuranc~ 
as is afforded by this policy applies also to such other auto-
mobile as of the date of its delivery to him, subject to the fol-
lowing additional conditions: ( 1) ..... (2) if the company 
does not insttre all automobiles owned by the named insured 
at the date of such delivery, insurance applies to such other 
automobile, if it replaces an automobile described in this policy 
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and may be classified for the purpose of use stated in this 
policy) but only to the extent applicable to d .. t replaced auto-
mobile; ( 3) the insurance afforded by this policy auto-
matically terminates upon the replaced automobile at the date 
of such delivery). and ( 4) this agreement does not apply 
(a) ..... nor (b) unless the named insured not1'.fies the com,-
pany within ten days following the date of delivery of such 
. vther automobile, nor ( c) .... nor ( d) unless the named in-
sured pays any additional premuim required because of the 
application of this insurance to such automobile" ( record, 
page 141 ). 
It will be noted that, under the foregoing provision of the 
policy, insurance automatically terminated on the Ford car 
January 31, 1939, and applied to the Dodge on the same day, 
subject, however, to the condition that Kelley should, within 
ten days from that dafe, give notice to the insurance com-
pany in order that such insurance be extended beyond the 
ten day period; ( see Dean, v. Niagara Fire Insurance Com-
j,,·any, 68 Pac. (2nd) 1021). The provision is in no wise 
ambiguous. It is crystal clear, and subject to but one con-
~truction. Furthermore, the provision is valid and can-
not be disregarded·; Spicer v. Hartford Fire Insurance 
()* *Company, 171 Va. 428; 199 S. E. 499. It is not 
subject to change, as the courts can no more change 
a policy than a negotiable note; Hannon v. Farm Bureau 
etc. C 01npa1i3,). 172 Va. 61, 200 S. E. 616. 
It is not difficult to understand why the ten days' notice 
requirement was inserted in the policy. The insurer is 
entitled to know what car it is insuring; North River In-
surance Co1npany v. Atk£nson) 137 Va. 313, 119 S. E. 46. 
It must, as a matter of self-protection, be careful in this re-
spect otherwise it cannot determine whether it is being paid 
sufficient premuims ; and the company would be helpless on 
fraudulent claims. An assured might dispose· of one car 
and acquire several others and wait until o~e or the other 
had become involved in an accident and then claim the one 
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so involved was the one that he intended to replace the car 
described in the policy. After Kelley parted with the Ford 
and acquired the Dodge he could have continued to operate 
any other car after the ten days had elapsed, and· upon its 
being involved in a serious accident, claimed, with collusion 
on the part of the owner that he had purchased it and intended 
that it should replace the Ford, and but for the ten day 
period provision, put upon the insurance carrier Ii~bility 
to the policy's limit, thereby protecting himself in any even-
t1ality. For such reasons insurance companies cannot be 
held liable unless timely notice is given; Zitr-ich General Ac-
<.ident etc, Co. v. Baum, 159 Va. 404, 165 S. E. 518. Notice 
of transfer is intended to protect from double indemnity, and · 
a requirement of such notice is valid. 
Who, and who alone, owned the _Dodge car from January 
31, 1939, to February 17, 1939, the date of accident? 
10* The plaintiff *contends that Wood-Hammond Chev-
rolet Company owned it from February 4, 1939, to 
February 13, 1939. The absurdity of such a contention is 
revealed when it is remembered that the only contract be-
tween that company and Kelley was at best an executory con-
tract for a trade of the Dodge for a new Chevrolet. Even 
in the absence- of any controlling statute no title or owner-
ship of the Dodge ever passed . from Kelley to Wood-Ham-
mond Chevrolet Company. On the other hand, whatever 
may have been the intention of the parties as to the preferred 
delivery order of February 4, 1939, sections 2154 (74) and 
2154 (75), Code of Virginia, did not permit transfer of 
title and ownershjp of the Dodge to the company under 
the undisputed facts in this case. 
This court held, in Thomas v. Jf ullins, 153 Va. 383, 149 
S. E. 494, that in order to complete the sale of an auto-
mobile, it is essential that the seller conform to the statutory 
requirements by delivering to the buyer a proper assignment 
of title; that a contract of sale of an automobile is merely 
executory, and if an automobile is destroyed the title re-
mains in the seller unless assignment of title to and notice 
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oi transfer of the automobile has been executed in accor-
dance with the Motor Vehicle Registration Act. 
This court, in Sauls v. Thomas Andrews & Company, 163 
Va. 407, 175 S. E. 760, stated that the case was controlled 
by Thomas v. Mullins, supra, and held that creditors could 
not seize an automobile in the hands of one who was a party 
to an executory contract for the trade of automobiles so 
long as title remained in the trans£ eror' s name; and 
11 * in that case it will be noted that *possession of both 
cars changed hands. In the instant case Wood-Ham-
mond Chevrolet Company never delivered possession of any 
car belonging to it to Kelley with the intent that .Kelley should 
become the owner thereof. 
A policyholder is presumed to know the provisions of his 
policy; Huddy Automobile Law (9th Ed.), Vol. 13 and 14: 
pages 42 and 55. But it is clear that Kelley knew of the ten 
day provision (page 59), nevertheless, he neglected to notify 
the company. After the accident occurred he tried to cir-
cumvent his error by falsely representing to the local agent 
of the insurance carrier that he had gotten the Dodge in 
Roanoke the night before the accident (page 98), when, as 
a matter of positive proof, he had gotten the_ Dodge on Jan-
uary 31st, sixteen days before the day he · reported to the 
local agent. 
Finding later, however, that the insurance company was 
fully armed with proof that the Dodge had been delivered to 
him (Kelley) on January 31st, he then illogically sought to 
show that he did not become the owner of the Dodge until 
Febr~ary 13th (page 31), the date the executory contract 
for sale was cancelled. The fallacy of such claim is apparent 
upon asking : "\Vho owned the Dodge on February 1, 1939 ?" 
Kelley owned it not only on that day, but on February 4th, 
otherwise, there would not have been the pref erred delivery 
order, and as above shown by the decisions of this court 
Kelley owned the Dodge from January 31st through Feb-
ruary 17, 1939. 
The plaintiff also advanced the theory that the period 
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from February 4th to February 13th should be de-
12* ducted from the *ten day period. This theory is 
readily exploded. To begin with, ownership of the 
Dodge by Kelley on January 31st was a f ait acconipli; next., 
it was contended by Kelley that there was a completed sale 
of the Dodge to Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company on 
February 4th; and finally it was claimed that the company 
on February 13th sold the Dodge to Kelley. It has already 
been pointed out that there was no completed sale of the Dodge 
by Kelley to the company, and it follows that the company 
could not thereafter sell the Dodge to Kelley. But suppose 
the theory is sound, nevertheless, there can be no recovery 
in this case, because if such a theory is sound, then the Dodge 
on January 31st replaced the Ford, and on its repurchase by 
Kelley from Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company, it is the 
same as if he had purchased a third car, and, consequently, 
the Dodge on its repurchase by Kelley did not replace the car 
described in the policy, but replaced the Dodge, which had 
formerly replaced the Ford. · 
Furthermore, to exclude the period from February 4th 
to February 13th from the ten day period would in effect 
Le an unauthorized tolling of the ten day period and the 
setting of a snare for the insurance company. There is no 
provision in the policy to justify tacking of additional time 
in order that the ten day period may be extended. 
It is clear from the foregoing, which deals with no con-
flicting testimony, that the two motions of the petitioner that 
the plaintiff's evidence be striken should have been sustained. 
13* *ERRORS IN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS 
Instruction A-1 
This instruction does not square with the evidence. In 
the first place Wood did not tell Kelley that he "could make 
Kelley a larger trade-in allowance on said Dodge than he 
could allow on said Ford," as stated in the instruction. 
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,v ood's testimony ( page 65) was: "Yes, he said that he was 
on a deal for a Dodge, and I told him to go ahead and trade 
for that Dodge and I could probably give him a better prop-
osition then." Furthermore, Kelley did not go to Roanoke 
at Wood's suggestion to trade the Ford for a Dodge. Kelley 
was already "on a deal" for the Dodge when he first talked 
with vVood. In the particulars just mentioned the instruction 
was misleading in that it gave undue leeway to the jury to 
conclude that Kelley in the language of the instruction "did not 
intend that said Didge should replace said Ford, but only 
intended that said Dodge should remain temporarily in 
Kelley's possession until he could trade it in to Wood ·on a 
11ew Chevrolet." 
The last quoted language is in conflict with Kelley's tes-
timony (page 31) that the Dodge replaced the Ford and 
with his statement (page 53) that his deal with Wood of 
Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company "was supposed to be 
consummated when he got the automobile for me." In other 
words the company was not to become the owner of the 
Dodge until it had delivered to Kelley a new Chevrolet. 
There was no basis for that portion of the instruction re-
lating to Kelley's intention of temporary possession of the 
Dodge, because Kelley did not have binding assurance 
14* *that he and Wood could agree on a trade of the Dodge 
for a Chevrolet. In reality, when Kelley traded the 
Ford for the Dodge he had nothing upon which he could base 
such an intention. The best that can be said is that Kelley may 
have had a hope that Wood would thereafter make an ac-
ceptable trade-in offer after Wood had an opportunity to see 
the Dodge. 
The instruction is also misleading and erroneous by reason 
of leaving to the jury the question of Wood's and Kelley's 
intent "that the ownership of said Dodge should then and 
there ( on or about February 4th) pass to said Wood's com-
pany." Their intention, if true, could not vest title and 
ownership of the Dodge in Wood's company. See Code 
~ection 2154 (74) and Thonias v. Mullins) supra. The in-
12 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
sttrance company and the courts are ·not concerned with in-
. tent· in cases such as this but only with actualities and 
the law governing them. 
If it be conceded (which is not done) that Wood's com-
pany became the owner of the Dodge on February 4th, 
nevertheless, when the Dodge again became the property 
of Kelley, it did not replace the automobile (Ford) described 
in the policy, but replaced the Dodge which had been pre·-
viously · owned by Kelley. Under such circumstances, if 
they in fact had existed, the court should have instructed the 
jury that the plaintiff could not recover, and not embraced in 
the instruction as a basis for plaintiff's recovery the language: 
"and if the jury further believe from the evidence that Wood's 
company retained such. alleged ownership until February 
13, 1939, on which date Kelley and Wood rued bargain and 
that Wood transferred his company's ownership of 
15* said Dodge to Kelley *on said date; and if the jury 
further believe that within ten days from February 
13, 1939, said Dodge was in the wreck which caused the 
plaintiff to lose his leg, and within ten days from February 
13, 1939, Kelley notified the Maryland Casualty Company's 
Clifton Forge agent to change the policy so as to cover the 
Dodge, then in such alleged event the· failure of Kelley sooner 
tn notify the company's agent to change said policy so as 
to cover said Dodge would not of itself alone prevent the 
insurance company from being liable in this case." The 
converse of that part of the instruction is the law. 
Instruction A 
The instruction is erroneous in that the jury were in-
structed to fix the classification of the Dodge 1:1pon Kelley's 
intentions at the time he traded the Ford for the Dodge, 
regardless .of subsequent intentions or actions. The class-
ification of the Dodge from a private car to a taxi could 
have been changed by Kelley at any time subsequent to 
January 31st so as to have voided the policy as to it. 
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Instruction B 
The objections to Instruction A-1 are applicable to In-
struction B, and it would be mere repetition to restate the 
legal principles. 
16* *Instruction C 
The instruction disregarded the provisions of the Motor 
Vehicle Act providing how ownership by purchase of an 
automobile may be consumated, and the instruction left 
open to the jury whether or not . there had been an actual 
sale of the Dodge by Kelley to Wood-Hammond Chevrolet 
Company. The intention of the parties to the trade-in agree-
ment was of no consequence. What they actually did is 
the important thing in det.ermining whether or not there 
was insurance coverage on the Dodge on the date of the 
accident. 
Instruction D 
Instruction D is misleading and contradictory. No sane 
juror could believe the first portion thereof and then believe 
that Kelley intended the Dodge to replace the Ford. Al-
though it concluded with a seemingly favorable statement for 
the insurance company, when read alone, the instruction was 
highly prejudical in its misleading and condictory form. 
Furthermore, the intention of Kelley was not the crux of the 
matter. When the Ford was traded for the Dodge the latter 
in fact ,::eplaced the Ford in all respects. Title and owner-
ship of the Ford passed to the Fulton Motor Company, and 
were replaced by title and ownership in Kelley of the Dodge, 
Kelley's intentions to the contrary notwithstanding; and it 
is safe to say that had the Dodge been in an accident on 
February 1st, 2nd or 3rd, this or any other court would 
hold that the Dodge replaced the Ford when the trade was 
made on January 31, 1939. 
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17* *INSTRUCTIONS OFFERED BY PETI-
TIONER AND REFUSED 
Instructions Nos. 1, S and 9. 
These instructions correctly stated the law applicable to 
the proper classification of the Dodge car, i. e., whether or 
'not the purposes for which it was to be used by Kelley wen; 
'°pleasure and business, excluding the carrying of passengers 
ior a consideration." It was represented to the insurance 
company what the purposes of use were to be. If the class-
ification was different from that represented in the policy, 
the company was entitled to proper instructions dealing· with 
the subject matter of classification; and there was ample 
evidence to support instructions 1, 5 and 9, which were 
erroneously refused. 
Instructions Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. 
These instructions properly stated the law of the case, 
and are in accord with the provisions of the policy, the 
authorities mentioned in the discussion of the given instruc-
tions and all the facts in the case. The refusal of the in-
~ tructions amounted to ignoring the provisions of the Motor 
Vehicle Act and the overruling by the trial court of the case 
of Thomas v. Mullins, supra. 
THE VERDICT SHOULD HA VE BEEN SET ASIDE 
The verdict in this case does not have the approval of 
the judge before whom it was rendered, and conse-
18* quently, it does *not have the weight of a verdict 
so approved. The case was heard before Judge 
Benjamin Haden, deceased, and, pending a motion to set 
aside the verdict, he died and was succeeded in office by 
Judge Earl L. Abbott, who overruled the motion. There-
fore, to all intents and purposes the matter is before this 
court de nova. 
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In fairness to Judge Haden, counsel for petitioner deem 
it proper to state that he was ill while the case was being 
tried and kept a cot in his office for rest periods in order 
not to overtax himself. He stated on several occasions that 
he was not sure as to the law of the case, but in view of the 
fact that there was very little conflict in the evidence he 
was primarily interested in obtaining a jury verdict, which 
he could later maturely consider, and then enter final judg-
ment one way or the other after satisfying himself as to 
the law, and thus avoid a new trial. 
Garnishment, in effect, is a suit by the defendant in the 
name of the plaintiff against the garnishee' and he occupies 
toward the garnishee the same position that his debtor 
occupied; his rights are no higher; Levine's Loan Office 
v. Starke, 140 Va. 712, 125 S. E. 683. 
It follows that the plaintiff in this case has no greater 
rights than Kelley under the policy ; Neilson v. A 111,erican 
etc. Insurance Cmnpany, 168 Atl. 436 (N. J.), 95 A. L. R., 
150 et seq.; Fentress v. Rutledge, 140 Va. 685, 125 S. E. 
668. 
What has already been stated concerning the law and the 
evidence on the motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence makes 
it apparent that the plaintiff has not made out a case, 
J. 9* and that *the veridct should be set aside and final 
judgment entered in favor of the petitioner. 
The errors hereinabove referred to as having ·been com-
mitted by the trial court in giving and refusing instructions 
a.re sufficient in themselves to vitiate the verdic~ and cause 
a reversal by this court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the Circuit 
Court of Alleghany County erred in holding the petitioner 
Uable under the policy of insurance and rendering judgment 
against it in favor of the plaintiff. 
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PRAYER 
Your petitioner, therefore, prays that a writ of error and 
supersedeas to said judgment complained of may be awarded 
your petitioner, in order that said judgment, for the -causes 
of error aforesaid, before you may be caused to come, that 
the whole matter in said judgment contained may be reheard, 
and that said judgment. may be reversed and annulled. 
STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 9 
Counsel for petitioner state that a copy of this petition 
was on the 1st day of October 1940, mailed to opposing 
counsel in the trial court and that this petition was 
20* · mailed to the· Clerk of *Court at Richmond, and 
further, that, should a writ of error be awarded, this 
petition is adopted as the opening brief on behalf of Mary-
land Casualty Company. 
ORAL HEARING REQUESTED ON PETITION 
Counsel for petitioner desire to state orally the reasons for 
reviewing the decision complained of, and request that oppor-
tunity be afforded therefor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 
By Counsel 
C. E. HUNTER 
and 
T. X. PARSONS 
COUNSEL. 
Roanoke, Virginia. 
Roanoke, Virginia, October, 1940. · 
We, C. E. Hunter and T. X. Parsons, attorneys practic-
ing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clifton Toney et als. 17 · 
that in our opinion there is error in the judgment entered 
en the 12th day of August, 1940, in the Circuit Court of 
Alleghany County, Virginia, against Maryland Casualty 
Company in favor of Clifton Toney, as set forth in the 
foregoing petition, for which the same should be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Received Oct. 2, 1940. 
C. E. HUNTER 
T. X. PARSONS 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Writ of error and supersedeas awarded. Bond $11,000.00. 
11/7 /40 





IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY 
OF ALLEGHANY, AT COVINGTON, VIRGINIA, 
. NOVEMBER 28, 29, 30, 1939. 
CLIFTON TONEY 
v. 
E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP, 
AND MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 
APPEARANCES : Counsel for Plaintiff: Hale Collins, and 
J. T. Delaney. 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Counsel for Defendant, Maryland Cas-
ualty Company: C. E. Hunter and T. 
X. Parsons. 
No appearance on behalf of E. G. 
Kelley and Carl Blankenship. 
Stenographic report of all of the testimony; the motions, 
oLjections and exceptions on the part of the respective parties, . 
and the action of the Court in respect thereto; the instructions 
offered, amended, granted and ·refused, and the objections 
and exceptions thereto; the exhibits introducted upon the 
trial, and the objections and exceptions thereto; and all other 
incidents of the trial of the case of Clifton Toney 
page 2 rv. E. G. Kelley, Carl Blankenship and Maryland 
Casualty Company, tried in the Circuit Court of 
the County of Alleghany, Virginia, at Covington, on the 
28th, 29th and 30th days of November, 1939, before Honor-
able Benjamin Haden, Judge of said Court, and a jury. 
page 3 r VIRGINIA, 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Alleghany County at 




E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP, 
AND MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY a 
Corporation 
Be it remembered that heretofore to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of ·the Circuit Court for the County of Alleghany, at 
the Courthouse thereof on the 19th day of June, 1939, came 
the plaintiff by his Attorney and issued a Suggestion against 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clifton Toney et als. 19 
the defendant, which is in the words and figures following 
to wit: 
SUGGESTION 
'fHE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: 
To the Sergeant of the City of Riclunond, Greeting: 
WHEREAS, on the 4th day of May, 1939, a writ of Fieri 
Facias was sued out of the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court 
of the County of Alleghany, by Clifton Toney to the Ser-
geant of the City of Clifton Forge, Va., directed, returnable 
to the Clerk's Office of the said Court on the 15th day of 
l\fay, 1939, upon a judgment on record in the said Circuit 
Court in favor of the said Clifton Toney against E. G. 
I(elley & Carl Blankenship for the sum of Twelve Thousand 
Dollars and no /100 cents, with interest thereon, to be com-
puted after the rate of six per centum per annum 
page 4 rfrom the 28th clay of April, 1939, till payment and 
Eighteen Dollars and Sixty Cents for his costs 
by him in that behalf expended; and it being suggested 
by the said Clifton Toney the judgment creditor aforesaid 
that by reason of the lien of his writ of Fieri Facias afore-
said, there is a liability on Maryland Casualty Company, a 
Corporation. 
THEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU, That you sum-
tnon the said Maryland Casualty Company, a Corporation, 
}~. G. Kelley & Carl Blankenship to appear before our Cir-
cuit Court of the County of Alleghany, at the Courthouse 
thereof, on the 1st day of July Term 1939, of said Court 
(being the 15th day of July, 1939), to answer the said sug-
gestion. And have then and there this writ. 
WITNESS, Olin J. Payne, Clerk of said Court, at the 
Courthouse the 19th day of June, 1939, and in the 163rd 
year of our foundation. 
And the same having been duly executed on the defendants 
and returned. 
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And at another day, to-wit: 
At a Circuit Court held for the County of Alleghany at 




E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP, 
and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 
a Corporation 
This day came the defendant the Maryland Casualty 
Company Garnishee, by their Attorneys, and filed 
page 5 ~thejr Answer, to the summons on Suggestion, 
which answer is in the words and figures follow-
. ing, to-wit : 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEG-
HANY COUNTY+ 
CLIFTON TONEY 
vs. Answer of Maryland Casualty 
Company, Garnishee, to Sum-
mons on Suggestion 
E. G. KELLEY,' CARL BLANKEN-
SHIP and MARYLAND CASUALTY 
COMPANY 
The answer under oath of Maryland Casualty Company, a 
Maryland corporation, to a summons on suggestion issued 
at the direction ·of Clifton Toney in whose favor a judgment 
of record was recovered in said Court, at the April, 1939 
term, against S. G. Kelle~ and Carl Blankenship for the 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clifton Toney et als. 21 
sum of $12,000.00, with interest from April 28, 1939, till 
paid, and $18.60 costs. 
This respondent, in answer to said summons on sugges-
tjon, states that at the time said summons was served on it, 
it was in no wise indebted to said judgment · debtors or 
either of them; and that it is not now indebted to them or 
dther of them. 
This respondent further states that it did not at said 
time have in its possession or under its control any property 
or effects of said judgment debtors or of either of them, or 
in which they or either of them had an interest; and no such 
property or effects has since come into the possession or 
under the control of this respondent. 
And now having answered fully to said summons, this 
respondent asks leave to be hence discharged with its costs 
in this behalf expended. 
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 
By Francis R. Porter 
Its Agent 
page 6 ~STATE OF VIRGINIA 
City of Roanoke, to-wit: 
I, Elizabeth Moore Foster, a Notrary Pu~lic for the City 
aforesaid, do certify that FRANCIS R. PORTER has per-
sonally appeared before me in my State and City aforesaid, 
and made oath that he is agent for Maryland Casualty Com-
pany, and as such is duly authorized to make this affidavit, 
and that the facts stated in the .foregoing answer are true. 
Given under my hand this 17th day of October, 1939. 
ELIZABETH MOORE FOSTER 
· · Notary Public. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
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At a Circuit Court continued and held for the County 
o:f Alleghany at the Courthouse thereof on Friday the 27th 
day of October 1939. 
The following order was entered : 
CLIFTON TONEY 
vs. Order 
E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation. 
This day came the plaintiff, by his attorney, and the 
Maryland Casualty Company, by its attorney. Thereupon 
the Maryland Casualty Company tendered and asked leave 
to file its answer to the summons on suggestion heretofore 
issued herein, which leave is granted, and it is ordered 
that said answer be, and the same is hereby filed. There-
cpon the Maryland Casualty Company, by its attorney, 
moved the Court to require plaintiff to furnish it 
page 7 rwith bill of particulars in this cause and the plain-
tiff, by his attorney, moved the Court to require 
the Maryland Casualty Company to furnish him with state-
ment of its grounds of defense in this cause, and to set this 
cause for trial. And the Court being of the opinion that 
both motions should be granted, it is ordered that the plaintiff 
file with the Clerk of this Court and mail a copy to the At-
torney of record for Maryland Casualty Company of its 
bill of particulars on or before November 1st, 1939, and that 
Maryland Casualty Company file with the Clerk of this Court 
and mail a copy to the Attorney of record for the plaintiff 
herein of its grounds of defense on or before November 15th, 
1939, and it is further ordered that this cause is set for trial 
on November 28, 1939. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
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At a Circuit Court continued and held for . the County of 
Alleghany at the Courthouse thereof on Wednesday the 1st 
day of November, 1939. 
CLIFTON TONEY 
vs. 
E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation, Garnishee 
This day came the plaintiff by his Attorney and filed his 
Bill of Particulars, referred to in the foregoing order, 
which is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
!Jage 8 ~VIRGINIA IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
ALLEGHANY COUNTY 
CLIFTON TONEY 
v. Summons on Suggestion 
E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and 1VIARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation, Garnishee 
BILL OF PARTICULARS 
For bill of particulars plaintiff relies on and will offer all 
cYidence admissable in proof of the following matters : 
( 1) On or about February 17, 1939 at a point on U. 
S. Route No. 60 about one mile south of the Town of Cov-
ington, Alleghany County, Virginia, plaintiff was struck 
by an automobile, owned by defendant, E. G. Kelley, and 
then negligently driven by defendant, Carl Blankenship, the 
servant of said Kelley, with the Permission and consent of 
said Kelley. 
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(2) As a result of being so struck, plaintiff sustained 
serious and permanent personal injuries and to recover dam-
ages of said Kelley and Blankenship, for such injuries, in-
stituted a proceedings by notice of motion for judgment 
in this court for that purpose against them for the sum of 
$12,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent 
per annum until paid and $18.60 costs. 
( 3) Defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, · a corpor-
ation, under and by virtue of its policy of insurance number 
15660950, issued by it on April 9, 1938 to said Kelley, had 
undertaken and agreed with and was obligated to said Kelley 
and said Blankenship to pay off and discharge on 
page 9 rtheir behalf plaintiff's said judgment against them 
to the extent of the limits of said policy. 
( 4) To enforce this liability of said Maryland Casualty 
Company under its said policy, plaintiff _in accordance with 
the statutes in such case made and provided caused a writ 
of fieri facias to be issued on his said judgment on May 4, 
1939, and, thereafter, instituted this proceedings to subject 
said liability of said Maryland Casualty Company to the 
lien of his said writ of fieri facias. 
In addition to the foregoing matters, the plaintiff will 
rely on every matter, which would be provable or available to 
him, if this proceedings were a suit in the name of the plain-
tiff on behalf of said Kelley and Blankenship against Mary-
land Casualty Company upon its said policy of insurance 
number 15660950. 
HALE COLLINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
CLIFTON TONEY 
By Counsel 
At a Circuit Court continued and held for the County of 
Alleghany at the Courthouse thereof, on Monday the 13th 
cl~y of November, 1939. 
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CLIFTON TONEY 
vs. 
E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY; 
a Corporation, Garnishee 
This day came the defendant, Maryland Cas-
page 10 ~ualty Company, Garnishee, by their Attorneys, 
and filed their grounds of defense, which grounds 
of defense, are in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEG-
HANY COUNTY 
CLIFTON TONEY 
v. Summons on Suggestion 
-E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Garnishee 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE 
Maryland Casualty Company, Garnishee, relies upon the 
following grounds of defense in the above entitled action: 
( 1) The declarations in the automobile policy No. 
15660950 issued by this defendant to E. G. Kelley on a 1937 
Ford Sedan, among other warranties contained the following: 
"The purpo~es for which the automobile is to be used are 
pleasure and business, excluding the carrying of passengers 
for a consideration." At the time of and prior to consum-
mation of the insurance contract, evidenced by said policy, 
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said Kelley knew that said Ford automobile would be used for 
the carrying of passengers for a consideration during the 
period from April 9, 1938 to April 9, 1939, yet, the said . 
Kelley falsely and fraudulently made said declaration that 
said automobile would not be used for the carrying of pas-
sengers for a consideration; .that this defendant relied upon 
said. declaration at the time said policy was issued; that 
said declaration was material, believed to be true by this 
def end ant and was an inducement to the is-
page 11 rsuance of said policy by this defendant; that said 
Ford automobile, contrary to said declaration was, 
so long at it was owned by said Kelley after said April 
9, 1939, used for the carrying of passengers for a con-
sideration; that said fraud vitiated said contract of in-
surance, and this defendant was therefore never obligated 
thereunder. 
(2) The Ford automboile described in said policy was 
disposed of by said Kelley on or about January 31, 1939, 
and said Kelley did not own said Ford automobile on or 
about February 17, 1939, the time the plaintiff was injured 
by another automobile; to-wit: a Dodge automobile, owned 
hy said Kelley, for which said injury the plaintiff obtained 
the judgment mentioned in this proceeding. Said policy 
in no wise afforded any insurance protection to said Kelley 
or anyone else for injury or damage occasioned from the 
use or operation of said Dodge automobile. 0 
( 3) Said Dodge automobile was acquired by said _Kelley 
for the purpose of carrying passengers for hire and to be-
come a unit of his fleet of taxies, and it was not intended 
to replace said Ford automobile for pleasure and business 
use, excluding the carrying of passengers for compensation, 
but in any event, no insurance afforded by said policy ap-
plied to said Dodge automobile at the time of said injury 
to the plaintiff, the said Kelley having utterly failed to 
uotify this defendant within ten days following the delivery 
of said Dedge to him, which said delivery of said Dodge to 
said Kelley was more than ten days prior to the date 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clifton Toney et als. 27 
of said injury. to said plaintiff. Said policy expressly pro-
" ides that automobile insurance thereunder shall terminate 
upon an automobile replacing the one insured unless the 
insured notifies the company within ten days following the 
date of the delivery. · 
page 12 t ( 4) Said Dodge automobile prior to and at 
the time of said injury to the plaintiff was used 
for the carrying of passengers for hire in violation of the 
declaration in the policy that the automobile insured there-
under would not be used, and as a result thereof, said policy 
vvas voided as to said Dodge automobile, if in fact it was 
ever insured thereunder by reason of the automobile insur-
ance provisions of said policy. 
( 5) The said Doclg~ automobile was not covered by said 
policy on the date of said in jury for the reason that the 
insured failed to pay the additional premium required. by, 
the policy in order to effect insurance thereon. 
( 6) This defendant will rely upon any and all other 
defenses which would be properly provable under the plea 
of the general issue in an independent suit against it on 
said policy by said Kelley. 
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 
By C. E. Hunter, 
Its Attorney 
And at another day, to-wit: 
At a Circuit Court continued and held for the County of 
Alleghany at the Courthouse thereof, on Tuesday the 28th 
day of November, 1939. 
EMPANNELLING JURY ETC. 
CLIFTON TONEY 
vs. Suggestion 
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E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, 
page 13 ~and on motion of the defendant, the Maryland 
Casualty Company, the plaintiff filed the bill of 
particulars and on motion of the plaintiff the defendant 
the Maryland Casualty Company, filed a statement of 
the grounds of its defense, and thereupon the defen-
dant the Maryland Casualty · Company, for plea said 
it is not indebted to the judgment debtors or either of them, 
and is not now indebted to them, and of this putteth itself 
upon the Country, and the plaintiff likewise. And a jury 
being demanded, thereupon came a .' jury of seven. persons 
of thJs County, drawn, summoned and selected in the man-
ner directed by law, to-wit: Kenneth Leape, R. B. Hopper, 
C. E. Fairburn, W. 0. Crawford, Earle Reardon, A. J. Oli-
ver Jr., and W. E. Milton, to whom there was no o~jections 
and who were sworn the truth to speak upon the issues joined, 
and having heard the evidence in part are adjourned over 
until tomorrow morning at ten o'clock A. M. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
At a Circuit Court continued and held for the County of 
Alleghany, at the Courthouse thereof on Wednesday the 
29th day of November, 1939. 
MOTION TO STRIKE EVIDENCE ETC. 
CLIFTON TONEY 
vs. Suggestion 
E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation 
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This day came again the parties by their Attorneys and 
the jury adj9urned over on yesterday pursuant to their 
adjournment and having heard the evidence for 
page 14 ~the plaintiff thereupon the defendant, the Mary-
land Casualty Co., moved the Court ·to strike 
the evidence of the plaintiff on the following grounds, First: 
The testimony is uncontradicted that notice was not given 
to the Insurance Co., within ten days of the delivery of the 
Dodge automobile to Mr. Kelley, and, therefore, under 
th~ policy of insurance, the insurance if any, automatically 
expired prior to the date of the· accident in which Clifton 
Toney was injured. Second: the Dodge automobile never 
passed _into the ownership of Wood-Hammond Chevrolet 
Company as in all causes under the statute and decisions 
of this State, the absolute ownership remained in Mr. 
Kelley until there had been delivered to the Wood-Hammond 
Co., a certificate of title duly assigned to the Wood-Ham-
mond Co. Third: U ncontradicted testimony is the use to 
which the Dodge automobile was to be put was that of a 
taxi, or, in other words a car for the carrying of passengers 
for compensation, contrary to the declaration in the policy 
as to what the use should be, and that the Dodge car could 
not be classified for the same us·e the Ford Automobile 
was to put under the policy, and: Fourth: Although it 
might be, in the absence of the statute and the decisions re-
ferred to, become the · property of Wood-Hammond Co., 
uever l'ias there been a repurchase of the Dodge automobile 
by Mr. Kelley from that Co., which would have to be treated 
as a wholly different car which would not supplant the car 
described in the policy according to the provisions thereof, 
but would supplant the Dodge under its prior purchase from 
the Fulton ·Motor Co., the said motion being argued is 
overruled by the Court, to which ruling of the Court, the 
defendant, Maryland Casualty Co., by counsel excepted, 
and thereupon all the evidence having been 
page 15 thea:rd the defendant by counsel, again moved 
the Court to strike the plaintiff's eyidence, on the 
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same grounds heretofore mentioned, which motion being 
argued is overruled by the Court, to which ruling of the 
Court, the defendant, Maryland Casualty Co., by counsel 
excepted, and the jury are adjourned over until tomor-
row morning at ten o'clock. 
And at another day, to-wit : 
At a Circuit Court continued and held for the County of 
Alleghany, at the Courthouse thereof, on Thursday the 30th 
day of November, 1939. 




E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
. and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys, and 
the jury adjourned over on yesterday, appeared pursuant · 
to its adjournment, and having heard the argument of coun-
sel, retired from the bar to consider of their verdict, and 
after sometime returned into Court, and upon their oaths 
say, "We, the jury, find that the Maryland Casualty Com-
pany is liable under the insurance policy introduced in this 
case, and hence we find that Maryland Casualty Company 
is indebted to E. G. Kelley and Carl Blankenship under 
· said policy in the sum of $10,000.00, with interest thereon at 
the rate of 6% from April 28, 1939, and $18.60 costs of 
judgment in action of Clifton Toney vs: E. G. 
page 16 ~Kelley and Carl Blankenship; and hence we find 
our verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Clifton Toney 
vs; the defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, in the 
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sum of $10,000.00, with interest from April 28, 1939, as 
aforesaid, plus $18.60 costs of said action of Clifton Toney 
,,s. E. G. Kelley and Carl Blankenship", and the jury are 
discharged. Thereupon the def enclant, Maryland Casualty 
Company by counsel, moved the Court to set aside the· 
verdict of the jury on the following grounds: 1. The 
admission of testimony over the exceptions of the Com-
pany's counsel; and the exclusion of testimony of(ered by 
the Company over the objections of the Company's counsel 
as disclosed by the record to the misdirection of the jury, 
to which exceptions were duly taken; and the failure of 
the Court to grant instructions offered by the Maryland 
Casualty Company. 2. The refusal of the Court to strike_ 
the plaintiff's evidence at the conclusion thereof on the 
motion of the defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, for 
reasons stated at the time said motion was made. 3. · The 
1 efusal of the Court to strike the plaintiff's evidence at the 
conclusion of all th~ testimony on the motion of the Mary-
land Casualty Company for reasons stated in the record.· 
4. The verdict is contrary to law and the evidence, which 
motion being argued, the Court not being fully advised as 
to its decision, takes time to consider. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
At a Circuit Court continued and held for the County 
of Alleghany, at the Courthouse thereof, on Saturday the 
20th day of July, .1940. 





E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation 
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This day came the parties by their respective attorneys, 
and the Maryland Casualty Company, by its Attorneys, 
move the Court as follows : 
(The Maryland Casualty Company, by its attorneys, moves 
that the verdict in this action be set aside and a trial de 
novo be ordered, and states the following as its grounds 
for said motion : 
At th:e time the evidence was submitted and the verdict 
·was rendered, the late Benjamin Haden was the Judge of 
the Circuit Court of Alleghany County, and was presiding 
as such judge. Pending his decision on the defendant's 
motion to set aside the verdict, Judge Haden died. It~ 
therefore, follows that another ju~ge cannot act upon the 
motion that the verdict be set aside, and the court at this 
time must, as a matter of course, set aside the verdict and 
a ward a new trial. This is especially true in view of the 
fact that there is no authentic record of all that transpired 
at the trial, nor does the present judge have the bene-
fit of the thoughts and intentions of the late judge as 
expressed to counsel at the time the instructions were be-
ing considered, and the various motions passed upon. For 
example, Judge Haden stated that he was not satisfied that 
the instructions given correctly stated the law, and further 
stated that he was not particularly concerned therewith, as 
is was his intention to give further study to the law of 
the case and then enter up final judgment for the plain-
tiff or defendant, and he further stated that he 
page 18 rwas chiefly concerned in getting a verdict, thus 
ending the case in the trial court when he had 
p:!.ssed upon the defendant's motion to set the verdict a-
~ide.) To which said motion, counsel for the plaintiff ob-
jected. , 
And the Court being of the opinion that said motion should 
be over-ruled, it is so ordered. Thereupon the said defen-
dant excepted to the ruling of the Court on the same grounds 
stated in the motion. 
Thereupon the Court proceeded to have arguments upon 
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the original motion of the defendant, Maryland Casualty 
Company, that the verdict be set aside, and its decision was 
taken under advisement. 
And this action is continued. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
At a Circuit Court continued and held for the County 
of Alleghany, at the Courthouse thereof, on Monday the 




E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and MA~YLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation 
This day came the plaintiff by his attorney and moved 
the Court that he be allowed to file a written statement in 
this action in accordance with the motion · heretofore made 
on the 20th day of July, 1940, which motion was granted, 
at the time of the filing of the defendants' motion 
page 19 ~and before the Court had ruled on the motion of 
the defendants which statement is as follows, 
to-wit: that the facts set out in the motion of the def en-
dants incorporated in the order of the Court over-ruling 
r-aid motion on the 20th day of July, 1940, are eroneous 
in that the facts contained and alleged therein are no part 
of the record in this action, there being a complete record 
of the _entire trial; that the late Judge Benjq.min Haden did 
-not express to the Counsel that he was not satisfied that the 
instructions given correctly stated the law, or that it was 
his intention to get a verdict -of the Jury for the plaintiff or 
defendant so that he could give further study to the lcl:w 
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of the case, but, on the contrary, the said late Benjamin 
Haden, Judge of said Court, carefully considered the in-
structions offered and given, and more than a full day ·was 
taken by counsel and the Court in argument of the law 
oi the case on the instructions, and instructions were given 
only after careful consideration by the Court of the argu-
n:ent of counsel and the preparation by counsel of the law, 
and by personal and individual study and investigation by 
the Court, which written statement covered the oral argu-
ment heretofore made, the plaintiff by counsel is allowed to 
file in this action, and it is accordingly so ordered. 
And now at this day, to-wit: 
At a Circuit Court continued and held for the County of 
Alleghany, at the Courthouse thereof on Monday the 12th 
day of August, 1940. 
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MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, a 
corporation, E. G. KELLEY and 
CARL BLANKENSHIP 
This day came the plaintiff, Clifton Toney, by his attor-
neys and the defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, by 
its attorneys, and the court having considered the said de-
fendant's motion to set aside the verdict and enter up judg-
ment in in its favor on the grounds assigned during the 
course of the trial, to-wit: the admission of certain im-
proper testimony over the objections of said defendant and 
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· the exclusion over its objection of certain proper testi-
mony offered by said defendant; the misdirection of the 
jury and the failure of the court to grant instructions of-
fered by said defendant; the refusal of the court to strike the 
1,laintiff's evidence; and that the verdict is contrary to the 
law and the evidence. 
And the court being of the opinion that the law and the 
evidence is with said plaintiff does overrule said motion. 
It is, therefore, considered by the court that the plaintiff, 
Clifton Toney, do have and recover of the defendant, Mary-
fand Casualty Company, the sum of $10,000.00, with interest 
thereon at the rate of 6% from April 28, 1939, until paid, 
and $18.60 costs in the action of Clifton Toney v. E. G. 
Kelley and Carl Blankenship, and all costs of said plaintiff 
in this behalf expended, to which action of the court in 
overruling said motion and pronouncing judgment 
page 21 ~against Maryland Casualty Company, said Mary-
land Casualty Company, by counsel, then and 
there excepted on the same grounds stated in support of said 
motion, and said Maryland Casualty Company signifying 
its itention to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the 
State of Virginia for a writ of error and supersedeas to 
the · judgment of this court, execution on the above judg-
ment is suspended for a period of sixty days to enable said 
defendant to prepare and file its bills of exception, upon 
the said defendant, or someone for it, within ten days from: 
this date, entered into bond in the penalty of $500.00, with 
good security, and conditioned according to law. 
page 22 ~CLIFTON TONEY 
vs. 
E. G. KELLEY, CARL BLANKENSHIP 
and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 
November 28, 1939: Court convened at 10 :00 a. m. 
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0. J. Payne, a witness of lawful age, having been duly 
sworn, testifies as follows : 
( Motion of exclusion of sworn witnesses from the court 
room is made by Mr. Collins.) 
( Objection is made by Mr. Hunter to the exclusion of the 
representatives of the Maryland Casualty Company from the 
opening statement.) 
(Judge Haden sustains the objection and orders all wit-
nesses to remain in the court room until after the completion 
of the opening statement.) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins : 
Q. Your name is Olin J. Payne? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Alleghany 
County? 
A. Yes, and have been for a long time. 
Q. Do you have the verdict rendered in the case of Clifton 
Toney vs: E. G. Kelley and Carl Blankenship? 
A. Yes. 
page 23 ~ Q. Will you read that judgment to the jury, 
please? 
A. I'll get the order book and read from that. "Virginia, 
In the Circuit Court of Alleghany County, April 2~, 1939. 
Clifton Toney, Plaintiff, vs: E. G. Kelley and Carl Blank-
enship, Defendants. This day came the plaintiff by his 
attorney and the defendants appeared in person. There-
upon came a jury of seven persons of this County, drawn 
summoned and selected in the manner directed by law, to-
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wit: W. D. Deeter, C. S. Robinson, J. H. Conner, Roscoe 
P. Carter, L. W. Carter, R. H. Douthat and J. B. Johnson, 
to whom there was no objection and who were sworn the 
truth of and upon the premises to speak,. and having heard 
the evidence and argument of counsel, retired from the bar 
to consider of their verdict, and after some time, returned 
into Court .and upon their oaths say, 'We, the jury, find 
for the plaintiff, Clifton Toney, and fix his damages at 
'fwelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) .' and the jury are 
discharged. Therefore, it is considered by the Court that 
the plaintiff recover from the defendants the sum of Twelve 
Thousand Dollars, the damages fixed by the jury in their 
verdict aforesaid, with legal interest thereon from this date 
till paid, and his costs by ~im about his suit in this behalf 
expended. On motion of the plaintiff by his attorney, and 
for good cause shown, it is ordered that execution issue on 
judgment aforesaid without waiting for the adjournme11t 
of this . Court, returnable to 2nd May Rules, 1939." 
Q. Do you have the pleadings on which that judgment was 
rendered? 
A. I have the Notice of Motion. 
Q. Will you read the Notice. of Motion to the 
jury? 
page 24 r A. '.'Virginia, in the Circuit Court of Alleg-
hany. Clifton Toney vs: E. G. Kelley and Carl 
Blankenship. To: E. G. Kelley and Carl Blankenship. 
You and each of you are hereby notified that the under-
signed will, on the 15th day of April, 1939, at 10 o'clock 
A. M. or as soon thereafter as such motion may be heard, 
move the Circuit Court of Alleghany County, Virginia, for 
a judgment against you and each of you jointly and sever-
ally for the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND ($15,000.00) 
DOLLARS, with interest from the date thereof and the 
costs incident to this proceedings, all of which is justly due 
2.nd owing by you and each of you to the undersigned for 
the damages, wrongs and injuries hereinafter set forth: 
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"On the 19th, day of February, 1939, at about 8 A. M. 
the under-signed, for the purpose of making necessary me-
chanical adjustments and other purposes, stopped the Ford 
truck and trailer, which the undersigned had been driving 
in a southerly direction along and over U. S. Route 60, at 
a point about one mile south of the town of Covington, Vir-
ginia. At said point the surfaced portion of said Route 
60 is approximately twenty (20) feet in width and the 
unsurfaced portion or dirt shoulder of said Route 60 along 
and adjoining said surfaced portion on its westerly side is 
approximately five ( S) feet in width. 
"Before stopping said Ford truck and trailer as aforesaid 
the undersigned drove said Ford truck and trailer out onto 
said dirt shoulder and along and adjoining said surfaced por-
tion on the westerly side thereof as far to the westerly side 
of said dirt shoulder as said Ford truck and trailer 
1Jage 25 rcould practicably and safely be driven so that when 
said Ford truck and trailer was stopped as afore-
said by the undersigned it rested on its extreme right or 
westerly side of said Route 60 with its right front and 
rear wheels on said surfaced portion and about one ( 1) foot 
in an easterly directio~ from the westerly edge thereof and 
about nine ( 9) feet in a wester 1 y direction from the center 
line thereof. 
"On stopping said Ford truck and trailer at .the place and 
in the position aforesaid the undersigned stepped from the 
driver's seat on the left side of said Ford truck onto said 
surfaced portion on said Route 60 and proceeded with the 
purposes for which the undersigned had stopped and after 
disposing of other matters and standing on said surfaced 
portion immediately adjacent to the right side of said Ford 
truck, stopped at the place and in the position aforesaid, pro-
ceeded with said mechanical adjustments by examining the 
oil gauge of said Ford truck situated in the left side of the 
cab of said Ford truck near the steering wheel, which said 
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e.."'(amination required the undersigned to place the upper por-
t10n of his body in the cab of said Ford truck and while 
standing on said hard surfaced portion of said Route 60 
immediately adjacent to the left side of said Ford truck 
and trailer stopped at the place and in the position aforesaid, 
with the upper part of his body in the cab of said Ford 
truck examining said oil gauge in connection with said 
mechanical adjustments the undersigned was struck by a 
Dodge Sedan, owned by you, E. G. Kelley, and then and 
there driven and operated by you, Carl Blanken-
page 26 rship, with the permission and consent of you, E. 
G. Kelley, and as your, E. G. Kelley's, servant and 
while about and furthering your, E. G. Kelley's, business 
a.s such servant, and sustained the injuries and damages of 
which the undersigned now complains. 
"Said Ford truck and trailer stopped at the time and place 
and in the position aforesaid and the undersigned engaged 
in said mechanical adjustments in the manner aforesaid, 
under the weather conditions then prevailing and the loca-
tion of said Route 60 in that vicinity were both clearly 
visible to a motor vehicle proceeding in a northerly direc-
tion along, and over said Route 60 for a distance of approxi-
mately four hundred ( 400) feet. At the time and place a-
foresaid there was no other traffic along and over said Route 
60. 
"At the time and place aforesaid and under the conditions 
aforesaid, you, Carl Blankenship, were operating and driv-
ing said Dodge sedan, owned by you, E.G. Kelley, in a north-
erly direction along and over said Route 60 as the servant 
of you, E. G. Kelley, and in the prosecution of an errant 
for you, E. G. Kelley, and it thereunder became and was yotir, 
Carl Blankenship's duty to drive and operate said Dodge car 
with ordinc1;ry care at all times having regard to the width, 
traffic and use of said Route 60 and the protection of life and 
property, to avoid colliding with and striking against the 
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undersigned and said Ford truck and trailer and to this 
end, in particular, to maintain a proper look-out for the 
undersigned and said Ford truck and trailer and to drive and 
operate said Dodge sedan under careful and com-
page 27 ~plete control, at a reasonable and proper rate of 
speed and upon your, Carl Blanknship~ s · right 
of the center of said Route 60, that is upon the easterly side 
of said Route 60. 
"Notwithstanding your, Carl Blankenship's, said duty, you 
· Carl Blankenship, at the time and place and under the con-
ditions aforesaid, negligently failed to drive and operate 
said Dodge sedan with ordinary care, and carelessly, reck-
lessly and negligently failed to maintain a proper look-out 
of the undersigned and said Ford truck and trailer and drove 
and operated said Dodge sedan without having it under 
careful and complete control, ·at an unreasonable and im-
proper rate of speed and upon ·your, Carl Blankenship's, left 
of the center of said Route '60, that is upon the westerly 
bide of · said Route 60 and with great force and violence into, 
UlJOn, and against the undersigned, who was then and there 
in the exercise of due care engaged in said mechanical ad-
justments in the manner aforesaid; whereby and J:>y reason 
whereof and as a proximate result of which the under-
signed was violently thrown and crushed against said Ford 
truck thereby breaking, bruising and mangling the under-
signed's left leg so badly that it had to amputated and other-
·wise mashing, bruising, crushing, and lacerating the un-
dersigned and injuring the nerves, flesh and bones of and 
crippling the undersigned, causing great pain and distress 
and permanent and incurable injuries to the undersigned. 
"And as a further result of the injuries caused by the 
negligence of you and each of you as aforesaid, the under-
signed has been caused from hence hitherto to suffer great 
mental anguish and physical pain, and will per-
page 28 ~manently continue so to suffer and has been obliged 
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to pay and expend divers sums of money, aggregat-
ing a large sum in and about endeavoring to be re-
lived and cured of said injuries, and has been and will be 
forced to lose a great deal of time from engaging in any 
gainful or productive occupation or calling, and has been 
and will continue to be prevented from driving motor trucks · 
and deprived, as a driver of motor trucks of his means of 
livelihood and has suffered and will continue to suffer 
great loss from the permanent dimunition of earning capa-
city by reason of the injuries aforesaid. 
"By reason whereof and as the proximate result of whicl! 
the undersigned has been damaged to the extent of Fifteen 
Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars. 
"Wherefore judgment therefor together with interest 
and co~ts as aforesaid will be asked at the hand of said court 
at the time and place hereinabove set out. 
"Given under my hand this 30th. day of March, 1939. 
HALE COLLINS, p. q." 
Q. Thank you, that's all. 




E. G. Kelley, a witness of lawful age, having been duly 
sworn, testifies as follows : 
page 29 r DIRECT EXAMINATION 
· By Mr. Collins: 
Q. Your name is E. G. Kelley? 
42 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
E. G. Kelley 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what is your address? 
A. 721 Pine Street, Clifton Forge, Alleghany County, 
\ .. irginia. 
Q. What is your occupation, or what was your occupation 
and what is it now? 
A. I am working in a taxi office. 
Q. At the time the policy in question was taken out, or at 
the time the wreck happened, what was your occupation then? 
A. I was in the taxi business. 
Q. You are now working for some one else and are not 
in business for yourself ? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Are you familar with this insurance policy (Policy 
in hand), this automobile insurance policy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This policy is automboile insurance policy No. 15-
660950. I will ask you to introduce this as Exhibit A. Now 
that is the policy which was in effect at the time jugdment 
was recovered by Clifton Toney against you and Mr. Blank-
enship. · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What company is this policy with? 
A. Maryland Casualty Company. 
Q. Are you familiar with Roman numeral I. Coverage A, 
Bodily Injury Liability in this policy? 
page 30 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you read that first paragraph to the 
jury? 
A. Where is that at? 
Q. First paragraph at the top of the page, Roman I. 
A. "To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the 
insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability 
imposed upon him by Ia w for damage~,' including damages 
for care and loss of services, because of bodily injury, in-
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cludng death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by 
any person or persons, caused by accident, and arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile." 
Q. That paragraph reads that the insurance company will 
pay on behalf of its insured, which is you, all sums which 
the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of 
liability. Now Mr. Kelley, you have heard Mr. Payne, the 
Clerk of the Court, read the Notice of Motion and Judgment 
in the former case against you. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In the reading of that Notice of Motion, did you notice 
that it mentioned a Dodge? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And in the policy, it mentions a Ford automobile .. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why is there this difference? How does that happen 
to be ? 
A. The Dodge replaced the Ford. 
Q. The Dodge car replaced the Ford car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From whom did you get the Dodge car? 
page 31 }- A. Fulton Motor Company in Roanoke. 
Q. When did you get the Dodge? 
A. On January 31, I believe. 
Q. January 31? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what did you do with the Dodge car on the day, 
or immediately after, you got it from the Fulton Motor Com-
pany? 
A. I turned it over to Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Car 
dealer in Clifton. 
Q.' What do you mean "turned it over"? 
A. I traded it in on another car. 
Q. When did you actually come into possession of the 
Dodge car as your own car? 
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A. On February 13. 
Q. Who had had the car? 
A. Mr. Wood. 
Q. Now, please state to the Court and the jury how that 
happened, how it happened that Mr. Wood, of the Wood-
I-:Iammond Chevrolet Company, had the car and what you 
did with the Ford, etc. 
A. I taken the Ford car-but before I did this, I went 
up to Mr. Wood and asked him about a trade on the Ford. 
Q. The Ford is the car covered by this policy, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You say you went to see Mr. Wood with the Ford car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why? 
A. To trade it in on another car. 
Q. Did you trade Mr. Wood that car? 
page 32 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. Why did you not trade him the Ford? 
A. He told me he didn't have a good sale for Fords and 
he couldn't allow me much on it. 
Q. Did he tell you how much? 
A. Well, he said $200.00 or $250.00, I don't recall ex-
actly. 
Q. Did you think you could get more than that from any-
one else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who else did you think you could get more from, and 
did the two of you-you and Mr. Wood-have a conversation 
about this? 
A. I told him I had been offered more by the Fulton Motor 
C~mpany, in Roanoke. He said "Go ahead and trade then." 
Q. Did you tell him what kind of a car you were trading 
for? 
A. I told him it was a 1937 Dodge Sedan. 
Q. You told him you could get more than he offered you, 
on a 1937 Dodge Sedan? 
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A. Yes. He told. me to go ahead and trade for the Dodge 
and he could allow me_ more on the Dodge than on the Ford. 
Q. He told. you to trade the Ford for the Dodge and that 
he could allow you more on the Dodge than on the Ford? 
A. Yes,' sir. 
Q. How much did they allow you on the Ford? You 
stated Mr. Wood allowed you $200.00 or $250.00 for the 
Ford. When ·you traded with the Fulton Motor Company, 
how much did they allow you? 
A. $475.00. 
Q. On what date were you at the Fulton Motor Company, 
in Roanoke? 
A. The day I taken the car away? 
page 33 ~ Q. Yes. 
A. January 31. 
Q. When was the next time you talked to Mr. Wood? 
A. I talked to him the next morning, around nine o'clock? 
Q. What was the nature of your conversation? 
A. I told him I had the car up at the house. 
Q. That you had talked to him about? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you then do? 
A. He said "Well, get in the car"-it was a demonstrator, 
I think-"and we'll go and look at it." 
Q. He had a demonstrator there which he was using, and 
you got into his car and went where? 
A. To my house, and looked at the Dodge car . 
. Q. Did he then tell you how much he could allow you for 
it, or did you have any conversation with him then? 
A. He said "We'll go back to the office and talk it over". 
I went back to the office with him and he agreed to allow 
me $350.00 OJ). the Dodge car. 
Q. Was there any other conversation when he allowed 
you that? 
A. He said he would allow me $350.00 on the Dodge and 
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pay the $200.00 off that I agreed to pay the Commerical 
Credit. 
Q. There was a $200.00 balance due on th~ Dodge? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Wood agreed to pay the $200.00 off and 
allow you $350.00, which would mean that you would get 
$5 50.00 for the car? 
A. Yes. 
page 34 ~ Q. What kind of a car were you supposed to 
get from him? 
A. A 1939 Chevrolet. 
Q. A 1939 Chevrolet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, at this date, as I understand you, you had this 
conversation with Mr. Wood, and this car was still up 
at your house? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the morning after January 31, or February 1? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you, if you did, deliver the car to Mr. 
Wood, and did you sign an order for a new Chevrolet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. State what took place. 
A. He agreed to give me that, and I turned the car over on 
the 4th of February. Let's see,-yes, the 4th I am certain. 
Q. On the 4th of February, you turned the Dodge car 
over to Mr. Wood? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you signed an order blank and agreed to purchase 
the Chevrolet and Mr. Wood purchased the Dodge? 
A. Yes, that's rgiht. 
Q. Could Mr. Wood deliver the car that you bought from 
him within a reasonable time to you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What was your next conversation with him, and on 
\iYhat date? 
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A. I-that was on February 13. 
Q. What was your conversation? 
A. I ,vent ttp and asked him if he had heard 
page 34 .0 ranything from the car and he said "No", and so 
he said that he wouldn't be able to get this special 
car, that it had to come from the factory and he didn't know 
when he could get it, and the deal would have to be called 
off, which I did. 
Q. What kind of special car was it to be? 
A. This car I agreed to buy was probably $40.00, or so, 
cheaper than the regular car by not having knee action on 
it or vacuum gear. 
Q. It was to be without knee action and vacuum gear? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On February 13, Mr. Wood was in doubt as to when 
he could get the car and you took your car back and called 
the deal off? 
A. Yes. 
Q. During the time the Dodge was in his garage, to whom 
did it belong? 
. A. Mr. Wood. 
Q. Did you ever use it m any way when it was in his 
garage? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Then the car was in the garage from February 4 to 
February 13 and Mr. Wood's car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time you called the deal off, had Mr. Wood done 
anything to the car, or did you have to pay him anything to 
get the car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What had he done to the car? 
A. I think he polished the car and did some little work on 
it. It amounted to three or four dollars. 
page 35 r Q. Then when you got the car back, you had to 
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pay Mr. Wood what he had spent on the car when it be-
longed to him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you did do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On February 13, you got the car back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, on February 4, when you sold your car to Mr. 
\V ood-that is the Dodge-and bought the Chevrolet, did 
you get a copy of their order or did both of you sign the or-
der and get a copy of that? 
A. Which order? 
Q. The order for the 1939 Chevrolet. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do with the copy of the order that you 
got from Mr. Wood by which you agreed to purchase the 
Chevrolet? 
A. I gave it to the insurance adjuster. 
Q. Do you recall his name? 
A. I know that he is the one sitting over there with the 
glasses on. (Witness points to E. A. Gentry.) 
Q. Mr. Gentry? 
A. · Yes, I believe that is his name. 
Q. When did you give it to him? 
A. I don't recall the date I gave it to him. Yes, I do. 
It was the morning of the 18th of February. 
Q .. How do you remember that as the date? 
A. He came up to make an adjustment on the wreck the 
Dodge car had had. 
page 36 ~ Q. The morning after the day of the wreck? 
·A.Yes. · 
Q. You are speaking of the wreck in which the colored 
man lost a leg? 
A. Yes, that's the wreck. 
Q. Now, Mr. Kelly, what use did you make of the Dodge 
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car from the date it was delivered to you by Mr. Wood on 
February 13 to February 17, the date of the accident in 
which Clifton Toney was injured? 
A. I used it for a family car and business. 
Q. Now when you say business, what do you mean? 
A. I mean that if I had a trip to go anywhere about my 
business, I went in this car. 
Q. Your personal car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever use the car as a car in the business of 
transporting passengers, for hire? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was it ever used by anyone for transporting of pas-
sengers? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was the Ford car that was traded to the Fulton Mo-
tor Company ever used by you or anyone else for the trans-
porting of passengers, for hire? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. For what purpose was the Ford car used? 
A. We used it mostly at home for my sister to go back 
and forth in. 
Q. And you used it when you had to go somewhere in 
it? 
page 37 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. You were in the taxi business, were you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how many taxis did you have? 
A. Three. 
Q. And this car in question was your business and family 
car used mostly by your sister? 
·· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that car was the one covered in this policy we 
have introduced? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Then did you make the same use of the Dodge car 
February 13 until February 17 as you did of the Ford car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Exactly the same use? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were either the Ford or the Dodge ever used for the 
transportation of passengers ? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. On the day of this accident in which Clifton Taney's 
leg was cut off, who ,vas driving the car? 
A. Carl Blankenship. 
Q. What was Blankenship directed to do on the morning 
of the accident? 
A. I told him to come to Covington and get a grill guara 
for the Dodge. 
Q. What is a grill guard? 
A. A thing that fits up over the bumper to protect the 
radiator .. 
page 38 ~ Q. The radiator is behind the grill? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if a truck or something backs up into the car, 
it will hit the guard and not the grill ? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you had sent him to Covington to get this guard? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you tell him that? 
A. I told him to take the Dodge and come to Covington 
on the morning of the 17th about two o'clock. 
Q. Do you operate the taxis day and night? 
A. Yes. 
Q. About two o'clock you told him what? 
A. I told him to go to Covington and get this grill guard 
we was looking at. 
Q. What do you mean? 
A. We was up here at this K K Store together, me and 
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Blankenship, and we looked at this grill guard and he wanted 
it on his car, but I was going to put it on the Dodge. 
Q. You had been to Covington before, together, and had 
seen this guard? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time did you tell him to come to Covington to1 
get it? 
A. I told him just as soon as he got off from work .. 
Q. vVhat did he do? 
A. He drove a taxi at nig)lt. 
Q. One of yours? 
A. Yes. 
page 39 r Q. What happened to the taxi he was driving? 
A. Another driver took it over: 
Q. The drivers worked the three cars by shift work and 
Blankenship had one shift· and got off at what time in the 
111orning? 
A. 7 :30 or 8 :00 o'clock. 
Q. On this night, which car did you tell him to t~ke to 
Covington? 
A. The Dodge. The others cars was being used as taxis, 
and I needed them. 
Q. You wanted the three to continue as taxis? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you told him to use the other car to come to 
Covington in to get the guard grill, or the grill guard? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, when ·this policy was issued you:, who did you 
buy it from? 
A. Mr. Grove. 
Q. D. M. Grove? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who is he? 
A. Salesman for that insurance company. 
Q. Agent for the Maryland Casualty Company, at Clif-
ton Forge? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Just state to the Court and the jury what were the 
circumstances or conversation you had at the time you bought 
this policy. 
(Objection by Mr. Hunter to the witness' answering this 
question as the policy speaks for itself.) 
(Objetction temporarily overruled by the Judge.) 
page 40 r A. W .ell Mr. Grove saw me on the street one 
day and asked me why hadn't I-that I didn't 
renew this insurance and I told him that was on another 
car and I told him I could get terms with another company 
I had it with, and he wouldn't give me any, that I had to 
pay him cash, and he said "Well, I can give you terms on 
insurance", and I said "I'm in the market for a policy" and 
l1e asked me what kind of a policy and I told him we had a 
car that the faimly used and that I used for business, and 
he said "Do you operate this car as a taxi?" and I said 
"No", ·what I meant by business was that my sister went 
back and forth in it and I used it to go get parts for my cars 
in, and for my own personal business, and he s_aid he would 
let me know in a day or two if he could insure this car, and 
he said a couple of days later that he could insure it. I 
told him the car was up in front of the house, to go up there 
and get the numbers off of it, and he djd, and I have him 
the first payment a couple of days later, which was $5.00. 
I can't remember whether it was $5.00 a month or a week, 
but I paid him the rest in installments, like that. 
(Mr. Hunter objects to this evidence as being immaterial 
. and having nothing to do with this case whatsoever. He 
adds that the company is not disputing the issuance of the 
policy and that the policy speaks for itself.) 
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(Judge Haden asks the jury to retire to its room.) 
(Judge Haden temporarily overrules the objection and 
allows the witness' answer to stay in the record.) (He 
adds that the witness should be allowed to answer these ques-
tions, and that later he will pass upon their relevany.) 
page 41 ~ Q. Mr. ·Kelley, at the time Mr. Grove went 
to get the numbers from the car, did that car, 
a.t that time, have taxi signs and for hire tags on it? 
A. Yes. 
Q.· The car did have the signs and tags on it? 
A. Yes, but I made it very clear to Mr. Grove how that 
car stood. 
(Objection is made by Mr. Hunter, as the contract be-
tween the company and this assured is the whole contract 
and nothing else. The policy holder is presumed to know 
the conditions of the policy and all about it.) 
(Mr. DeLaney asks if Mr. Hunter is going to continue 
taking depositions throughout the case.) · 
(Mr. Parsons answers that counsel always shows fraud, 
if possiblity of faud exisits.) 
(Judge asks counsel any authorities which they may 
have.) 
(Mr. Collins : "Knowledge of an agent is no~ice to the 
company, and that company cannot insist upon the letter 
of the policy contrary to the information that the agent 
had.") · 
(Judge: "You gentlemen have had vast experience along 
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that line, and I am new at it. Is it like fire insurance which 
is void if there is any other insurance on the prope~ty ?") 
(Mr. Collins: "If a fire insurance agent sells me insur-
ance and he knows at the time that I already have another 
policy, the company cannot insist that the second policy is 
void because I had a first policy.") 
(Judge: "If any different rule applies, I would like to 
have it.") 
(Mr. Hunter: "\i\That the car was to used for, 
page 42 rit is insured for. Although the car may have had 
· taxi signs and for hire tags on it, he solemnly 
makes the declaration that the car is not to be used for the 
purpose of a taxi, when it is going to used.") 
(Judge: "So far, Mr. Collins has not tried to introduce 
any evidence about that. If I recall your opening statement, 
Mr. Hunter, you made quite a point to the jury that the first 
car-the Ford car-had for hire tags on it. I think that 
in explanation of that and in further answer to the plain-
tiff's contention that the insurance company was not de-
frauded, the plaintiff, or I should say the witness, should be 
allowed to show that the agent knew that the car had taxi 
signs on it and for hire tags on it. Therefore, I am going 
to overrule your objection to the answer that Grove saw 
some printing on the car indicating that it could or might 
or would be used as a taxi.") 
(To which Mr. Hunter excepts.) 
(Jury returns to the Court room and is read the ques-
tions and answers asked and answered in their absence.) 
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Q. Mr. Kelley, you have heard the stenographer read the 
questions and ·answers you made to the jury. Why did you 
have taxi signs and for hire tags on that car, if you were 
using it for private purposes? 
A. For a case of emergency. · 
Q. What do you mean by a case of emergency? 
A. Well, if one of the other cars was turned over, I could 
put the insurance on the car and run it as a taxi. 
Q. How long would it take to transfer and get the proper 
insurance? 
A. Just long enough to go to see the agent. 
page 43 r Q. How long would it take to get the for hire 
tags? 
A. Sometimes a week or longer. 
Q. Why is it it would take you longer to get the for hire 
tags? 
A. You have to get an exemption card from the State 
Corporation for State tags. 
Q. You have to get an exemption card from the State 
Commissioner, in Richmond, before you can buy the for 
hire tags 
A. Yes. 
Q. And sometimes it takes a week or longer to get the 
card and the tags? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that is the reason you kept the tags on that par-
ticular car? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. You stated in an emergency, you might use the car. 
\\That do you mean by an emergency? 
A. Lots of times by people running into the other cars 
or wrecking them. 
Q. And it might take a week, or two weeks, to replace or 
repair the wrecked car and get it back in taxi service? 
A. At least a week or longer. 
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Q. And you got the tags for the ·other car so that you 
could put it into service immediately? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time that you bought this policy and had the 
conversation with Mr. Grove, did you explain that to him 
and the reason for it? 
A. Yes. I told him just how the car stood. 
(Mr. Hunter objects to this testimoriy as being immater-
ial.) . 
page 44 ~ (Judge: "Objection overruled.") 
Q. Did you explain to Mr. Grove the reason you kept the 
for hire tags on the car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you, at that time, have a taxi sign on it, also? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On this Ford? 
A .. Yes. 
Q. Did you have the taxi sign for the same purpose? 
A. Yes, for that; and advertisement. 
Q. For the same purpose and for advertisement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In the statement read to the jury by the stenographer, 
you stated something about your being able to get terms 
and Mr. Grove wouldn't give you terms. 
A. I mean by that that I bought another policy from Mr. 
Grove, one that had taxi coverage, and Mr. Grove wouldn't 
give me terms on it. 
Q. What do you mean by terms? Do you mean credit? 
A. Yes. · 
Q. And by credit, you mean he would give you time, 
and let you pay $5.00 a week, $5.00 a month, or whatever 
the case may be.? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, after this accident on February 17, did you 
notify the adjuster for the Maryland Casualty Company 
of the accident? 
A. Mr. Grove. I notified him. Then Mr. Grove notified 
him. 
Q. You notified Mr. Grove and he the adjuster? 
page 45 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did the adjuster investigate the accident? 
A. Yes, on the 18th. 
Q. Did you .have a conversation with him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you write any letters to him and receive any letters 
from him? 
A. I received a card right after the wreck happened that 
any suit papers would be mailed to them. 
Q. For you to mail any papers to them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you receive any other papers from him? 
A. I think it was the 14th of March, they sent me a 
letter saying I wasn't insured. 
Q. ( Holding card) Is this the card you received from 
Mr. Pait with reference to. this action? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, this card is styled with reference to Clifton 
Toney and is numbered 58991-0-.39 and is a report that a 
report of the above captioned accident was received. It says 
that "if any claim is presented, refer the parties to us as 
insurance carrier, also if any suit papers ( summonses, writs, 
complaints, etc.) are served, please send them to this office 
immediately." I will ask you to file that with the steno-
grapher, marked "Kelley Exhibit B". 
Now, Mr. Kelley, I will hand you this letter from the 
Maryland Casualty Company, dated March 14, and ask you 
if you received this by registered mail? . 
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page 46 r A. Yes. 
Q. Now this letter is dated March 14, 1939. 
The date of the accident when Toney was injured was Feb-
ruary 17, was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This letter states: . "Mr. E. G. Kelley, Clifton Forge, 
Virginia. Dear Sir: With reference to the accident occur-
ring on February 17, 1939, involving your Dodge taxi 
cab with a truck driven by Clifton Toney, wish to state 
that we have investigated and find that this Company has 
no coverage for the car involved in this accident, and it is 
necessary, therefore, for us to disclaim coverage on any 
nature on the car involved in this accident. In view of the 
above we will not be in position to protect your interests 
should claim be made or suit instituted. We would be glad 
to have you acknowledge receipt of this letter advising wheth-
tr or not you agree with us. Should you disagree it fs 
our present intention to institute proceedings for a declar-
atory judgment in the Federal Courts in urder that the 
question of coverage may be definitely determined." That 
is the letter you received by registered mail about March 
J.4, or maybe, the 15th? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you to file this letter, marked "Kelley Ex-
hibit C". 
A. I will hand you a letter dated "Clifton Forge, Va., 
M.arch 17" and ask you if this is not a copy of your letter, 
of your reply to that letter? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your reply states: "A. H. Pait, Manager, Mary-
land Casualty Company, Box 208, Staunton, Vir-
page 47 rginia. Dear Sir: I received your letter of March 
15th. and am very much surprised about your 
statement that there was no insurance covering the acci-
dent. I will appreciate it very much if yqu will advise 
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me for what reason you claim there was no insurance be-
cause the premium was paid when I got the policy''. I 
will ask you to file this marked "Kelley Exhibit D". 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Kelley, I hand you a letter dated March 24, 1939, 
from the Maryland Casualty Company, and ask you if 
you received this letter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This letter is dated March 24, 1939, Staunton, Virgin-
ia, and is from the Maryland Casualty Company. It states: 
'Mr. E. G. Kelley, Clifton Forge, Virginia. Dear Sir: 
We have noted yours of March 17 in answer to ours of March 
14 in connection with coverage for the accident of February 
17. You are asking me to advise what reasons we have for 
c:laiming there was no insurance. We have· never· had· a: 
policy on the car involved in this accident, and we are there-
fore at a loss to understand why it was reported to us in 
the first place. We have carried no policy with you at any· 
time covering any car used in taxi service, and our in-
vestigation shows that you have secured no registration 
card from the Division of Motor Vehicles on a privately 
owned car, and further that the Ford which we originally 
covered for private use was used as a taxi and there was·, 
therefore, no coverage for that car which we understand 
was traded in several weeks before this accident· and with-
out notice to this Company. We trust this ex-
page 48 ~plains the situation to your entire satisfaction." 
I will ask you to file thrs as "Kelley Exhibit E". 
Q. Now, Mr. Kelley, at the time you received this letter, 
on March 24, 1939, stating that "we have never had a policy 
on the car involved in this accident ... and we have carried 
no policy with you at any time covering any car used in 
taxi service"-! will ask you if you ever had a policy with 
the Maryland Casualty Company covering a taxi cab? 
A. That was the first company I had a policy with when 
I started in business, in October, 1937. 
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Q. Who did you buy that policy from, if you recall, 
Mr. Kelley? 
A. Mr. D. M. Grove. 
Q. · The same gentleman who sold you this other policy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was to cover a taxi? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then their statement in this letter that they never 
C'arried any insurance for you on a taxi cab was not true? 
A. That policy there was on a taxi. 
Q. Their statement that they had never insured any taxi 
for you was not true, then, was it? 
A. That's right. 
Q You had a policy on a taxi with them, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Mr. Kelley, a Notice of Motion, the same one 
Mr. Payne read this morning, was served on you, I think, 
· sometime in March. 
page 49 ~ A. That was for the suit? 
Q. Yes. 
·A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Mr. Kelley, when you got that Notice of Motion, 
what did you do with it? 
A. I tried to get a lawyer at that time, and I couldn't 
arrange to get the money to pay him. 
Q. What did you do with the paper that was served on 
you? 
A. The paper of the suit? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I tried to get a lawyer and then I came to see you. 
Q. At the time you came to see me, as a matter of fact, 
hadn't you arranged with Mr. Tom Wilson to represent 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I told you to go back to ·him and see what to do, 
isn't that a fact? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall-I will hand you this letter to refresh 
your memory-as to what you did with the Notice of Motion 
served on you, and whether or not you had any advise from 
Mr. Wilson as to what to do with it? 
(Mr. Hunter objects to this line of testimony about a 
1natter occuring after the accident.) 
(Judge Haden overrules the objection, saying he thinks 
Mr. Collins intends to ask him something pertinent to it.) 
(To which ruling, Mr. Hunter excepts.) 
Q. Is this a letter which you sent to the Maryland Casualty 
Company of Baltimore, Maryland? 
page 50 r A. Yes. 
Q. This letter is dated Clifton Forge, Virginia, 
March 30th, 1939. "Gentlemen: Under policy No. 15-
660950 issued to me I hand you herewith a notice of motion 
which has been today served on me by the Sergeant of the 
City of Clifton Forge, Virginia". Do you recall seeing 
Mr. Wilson writing this letter and sending it to Baltimore, 
Maryland 
A. Yes, and he was with me when I mailed it. 
Q. I will ask you to file this as "Kelley Exhibit F". Now, 
Mr. Kelley, I wish you would look at this delivery order of 
Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company and see whether or. 
not that is your signature on the bottom of it. 
A. Yes, sir, it is. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Hunter: 
Q. I believe the Ford car you had insured under this 
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policy, you traded to the Fulton Motor Company for a Dodge. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall what day the Dodge was delivered to 
you by the Fulton Motor Company? 
A. On January 31. 
Q. You had that car insured for fire and the£ t, did you 
11ot, when you purchased it from the. Fulton Motor Company? 
A. Not unless they put it on it. 
Q. Don't you know that Dodge car was insured for fire 
and the£ t, and you were charged a premuim on it the very 
day it was delivered to you? · 
page 51 r A. They put that on it. I didn't have. that 
on it. 
Q. They did it with your knowledge and consent, . -did 
they not? 
A. I signed the proper papers to get the car. 
Q. And to get the insurance? 
A. What insurance? 
Q. For fire and theft. · 
A. I signed the papers-the proper papers to get the 
car out of the garage. 
Q. Did they deliver a title to you for the Dodge car? 
A. On what date? 
Q'. Didn't you get a certificate of title from the Fulton 
Motor people? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Wasn't that certificate of title turned over to the 
company that financed your note? 
A. I never had it. 
Q. You consented to all that? 
A. I signed the papers to take the car out. 
Q. And The Fulton Motor Company was to have a 
lien for the def erred purchase money? 
A. The Commercial Credit Company was. 
Q. The Fulton Motor Company turned it over to them? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. They had a lien. on the Dodge car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. They had a lien on the car turned over to you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had a title to it, did you not? 
page 52 r A. No, sir, I d1dn't have no title. The title 
is always endorsed on the lien. . I didn't have a 
title. 
Q. You became owner of the car on January 31, did you 
not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe you went to Mr. Wood, of the Wood-Ham-
mond Company, I believe ·it is called, ·with the idea of trad-
ing the Dodge for a Chevrolet. 
A. That was before I got the Dodge. 
Q. You went to Mr. Wood with the idea of buying a 
Chevrolet? 
A. Yes. -
Q. Now, what were you to pay him for this Chevrolet? 
A. Was that after I got the Dodge? 
Q. No, what were you to pay for this new Chevrolet? 
A. That was after I got the Dodge. 
Q. You owned the Dodge on January 31, and after you 
got the Dodge, you went to Wood-Hammond Company. 
How were you going to pay for this 1939 Chevrolet? 
A. I was going to pay for it. I was going to have it on 
contract. 
Q. Did you -have a written contract with Wood-Hammond 
ior the 1939 Chevrolet? · 
A. I had the order there for it. 
Q. That is the only thing in writing? 
A. Yes, with the Wood-Hammond. 
Q. 'It is headed a "Preferred Delivery Order" for a new 
Chevrolet that was to cost you $868.00~ · 
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A. It wasn't to cost that much. 
Q. How much was it to cost you? 
A. The car was supposed to run around 
page 53 ~$780.00-the car I was supposed to get. 
Q. Have you looked at this delivery order? 
A. Yes, sir, I have seen it. 
Q. Doesn't it say $868.00 ?" I will ask you to look at 
it now. 
A. That's right. That's what's on there. 
Q. How were you going to pay that $868.00? 
A. Well, when the car came in, I was supposed to start 
paying $25.00 every month on it, after thirty days after 
delivery. · 
Q. And . you were to deliver to them this Dodge car? 
A. They already had it. The morning I got that contract 
that statement there, he had the car to hold until he got 
the car I wanted. · 
Q. When you got the car you wanted, you were to pay 
him, and turn over the Dodge to him? 
A. He already had the Dodge. 
Q. You were to turn over the title to it to him when you 
got the Chevrolet, weren't you? 
A. I didn't have no title. 
Q. You hadn't given the title to the Wood-Hammond 
Company? 
A. No, sir, he was supposed to own the car from the 
time I turned it in to him whether I ever got the car or not. 
Q. How much was he supposed to pay you for it? 
A. The deal was supposed to be consummated when he 
got the automobile for me. He was going to get it for me. 
Q. He didn't get it for you. When he didn't get it, when 
was he to become the owner of this Dodge? 
A. The day he gave me this order. 
page 54 ~ Q. How much was he going to pay you for 
the Dodge? 
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A. I guess if he had never gotten the automobile, he would 
have paid me $350.00 for it. 
Q. Had you ever agreed with him that he was to pay 
you $350.00? 
A. I never seen a dealer yet not get the car. He would 
have gotten it, but I held out on him. 
Q. You cancelled the contract-you didn't . hold out for 
the car? 
A. That's right. 
Q. This order you gave him on February 4, 1939, you 
cancelled ? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. He never made any claim on the Dodge, did he? 
A. What? 
Q. Did he claim he owned the Dodge? 
A. Certainly, he did. 
Q. He did? 
A. Absolutely. He owned it -from the time I put it in 
there. 
Q. He owned that car from the time you put it in the 
garage? · 
A. From the time I put it in the garage until I got it 
back. 
Q. He agreed that you could cancel the order? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And all you had to do was the pay Wood-Hammond for 
some little work they had done? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I believe you stated that you gave this little 
piece of paper, called a "Preferred Delivery Order" to Mr. 
Gentry, the adjuster for the Maryland Casualty Company? 
A. That's right. 
Q. But that wasn't until after you cancelled this delivery 
· order? 
page 55 r A. That's right. 
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Q. You say Mr. Gentry came down here to investigate 
this accident. On what day did he get here? 
A. To my best knowledge, Febntary 18, the morning 
after the accident happened. 
Q. What did he do? 
A. He came up to my office the first thing, and he wrote 
down what I knew and what the driver told him, and then 
we came to Covington arid he looked at the place the ac-
cident happened, and then we went to the garage and looked 
at the car, and then came on back to the court house and 
talked to the State Police about the accident. 
Q. In other words, he gathered information about how 
this accident occurred ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After he went back, after he left here, you got thfs, 
postcard from Mr .. Pait, from Staunton? 
A. I think . he probably made another trip back to get 
that statement typed down and signed. 
Q. You have a postcard, marked the 17th of February, 
which you received and were told that the report of the 
accident had been received. 
A. To Mr. Grove, yes. 
Q. And you were told to send any papers in connection 
with a suit to them, and so on, were you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, let me see if I have a correct idea about this 
statement about the insurance. I believe you 
page 56 ~stated that this Ford car described in the policy 
had taxi signs on it and taxi tags on it and you 
intended to use it in case of an emergency in the taxi 
business. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You said you were going to have it insured. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How was that g-oing to be insured? 
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A. By taking a policy off the wrecked car and putting 
it on it. I had insurance in another company. 
Q. You had your taxis insured with another company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What company? 
A. Traveller's. 
Q. When you used this Ford for pleasure, you expected 
the Maryland Casualty Company to cover it? 
A. Yes. · 
Q. Did you expect to give notice to th~ Maryland Casualty 
Company when you used this car as a taxi? 
A. I could have cancelled the policy. 
Q. You say you would have cancelled the policy. But 
didn't I understand you to say that what you· intended to 
do was to use this Ford car for an emergency and notify 
the Traveller's? 
A. I had a perfect right . to do that. 
Q. Was that your intention? 
A. If another car would have had an accident, I would 
have taken and replaced it with this car with the insurance 
on the car that had been wrecked. · 
Q. You say you had a per£ ect right to do that. 
page 57 ~ I am asking you if you intended to do that? 
Was that your intention? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. To have that car in an emergency insured under a 
policy you had with the Traveller's, and otherwise, to have 
it covered by the Maryland Casualty Company? 
A. I said I would use this car in replacement and use the 
insurance I had with Traveller's and cancel the Maryland 
Casualty Company's insurance. 
Q. Then you would cancel the Maryland Casualty Com-
pany policy in a case of emergency? 
A. Well, you see, probably if a car turned over and was 
torn up, it wouldn't have been fit to use it for a taxi again. 
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Q. And if the car was not torn up? 
A. Then to continue to use the car. 
Q. Don't automobiles hit pedestrians and do damage to 
the pedestrians, but not to the car? 
A. Well, sometimes, the automobile has a flat tire, or 
something like that, and isn't out over a hour at a time. 
Q. During 1939, did you ever use that Ford in the taxi 
business? 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. Did you not use it as a taxi in any part of 1938 while 
this policy was in existence? 
A. What policy? 
Q. Maryland Casualty Company policy. 
A. I used that car at a:II times at home and for business 
purposes. 
Q. Did you ever use it for a taxi? 
A. No, sir. 
page 58 t Q. YOU said if an emergency arose, you would? 
A. I didn't have no occasion for it. 
Q. Do you recall what statement you made for fire and 
theft insurance on this Dodge when you got it from the 
Fulton Motor Company as to the use you were going to put 
the Dodge to? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you tell them? 
A. Taxi. 
· Q. When you applied for fire and theft insurance on the 
Dodge automobile, you told them it was going to be used 
for taxi purposes·? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was your intention? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You meant what you stated? 
A. I meant when I got that car properly insured I was 
going to put it in service. 
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Q. What do you mean? 
A. I mean when I got the proper coverage on it. 
Q. You were going to postphone it for taxi service until 
when? 
A. Just as soon as I could get it straightened out. 
Q. You stated that according to your understanding, you 
had parted with ~his car .to Wood-Hammond Company-
c,n what date? 
A. What was the date I let it go? 
Q. Yes. 
A. On the 4th of February, 1938~-no, I mean 1939. 
Q. Why didn't you notify the Maryland Casualty Com-
pany that you had parted with the Dodge, and 
page 59 ~also, that you had parted with the Ford? · 
A. Mr. Grove said I had ten days to notify 
them in. 
Q. ·Well, you parted .with the Ford January 31, 1939; 
more than ten days elapsed between that time and the acci-
dent. 
A. Yes, but I didn't have a car at that time. 
Q. You stated that you had taxi tags on this Ford and 
also you had taxi tags on the Dodge. 
A. The same license that came off the Ford was on the 
Dodge.· 
Q. You said you were going to use that Dodge or Ford 
in an emergency. Now, how much more does a State taxi 
tag cost than ordinary tags do? 
A. About $13.00. 
Q. Three or four times as much? 
A. No, around $13.00 to $15.00, according to the weight. 
Q. How much would the regular car license cost for the 
Dodge or the Ford? 
A. Well, the Ford runs from sixteen to seventeen hundred 
pounds. 
· Q. How much does the license cost for private car tags? 
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A. Well, you can take and figure how much the car ~eighs 
a.t 40c a hundred and then figure on 70c a hundred for the 
taxi, and subtract, and have the answer. 
Q. The taxi tags cost about twice as much, though, don't 
they? 
A. Well, no, sir, I don't think so. 
Q. :ijow about city tags? Do you have to get for hire 
tags in the City, or from the City? 
A. Yes, if you get the for hire tags. You don't neces-
sary have to get the for hire tags if you have a license .. 
Q. I don't know the law in Clifton Forge, but 
page 60 r I am asking you if you had to get for hire tags 
in the City of Clifton Forge. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you had those? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did you have taxi signs painted on the car? 
A. On the night of the 16th, the day before the wreck 
happened. 
Q. And when this wreck occurred, you had taxi signs 
on the Dodge? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What model was your Ford? 
A. 1937. 
Q. How far had you driven the Ford on January 1, 1939? 
A. I didn't buy that car brand new. I don't know. 
Q. How long had you had it? 
A. I got it-I don't remember just how long. 
Q. Can't you proximate it? 
A. I couldn't say for sure. I think maybe a year or maybe 
longer, maybe less. 
Q. As a matter of fact, didn't that car go some sixty.-
eight thousand miles during that time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How much would you say it went? 
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A. I don't have any idea, but I know it didn't have that 
much mileage on it. 
Q. You don't know how much it had on it. 
A. I know it wasn't 68,000. 
Q. Didn't the speedometer show 68,000? 
A. No, sir. 
page 61 r RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. In your experience with Ford V-8's, have you found 
any of them that will run 68,000 miles? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In your examination by Mr. Hunter, you referred to 
an emergency. Did you mean by that that each time an 
emergency arose you would put this car iri service, or if 
when an emergency arose you would put this car, if the 
other car was destroyed, into ~ervice permanently? 
A. Yes, permanently. 
Q. If you had an emergency, you meant to put it perman-
ently into service and you would have transferred the in-
surance from the other car or have had Mr. Grove convert 
this policy into a taxi policy? 
A. He said at any time he could change it into a taxi 
policy, by giving him notice. 
Q. Mr. Hunter has asked you about buying fire and theft 
insurance on this car in Roanoke. Was not whatever insur-
ance was on the car put on it by the finance company under 
the contract ? 
A. Yes . 
. -Q. How much were you to pay in difference on the trade-
in to the Fulton Motor Company?-For this Dodge car? 
A. I was supposed to give them $210.00. 
Q. Is there any difference between this $210.00 and the 
)rice on the contract? 
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A. Yes, the price on the contract was $200.00. 
page 62 ~ Q. And the difference between that and the 
$210.00, or the $10.00, was for the insurance 
cost, was it not? 
A. Yes, the Commercial Credit Company put that on 
it. 
Q. When you bought this car, it was financed through the 
Commercial Credit Company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they were supposed to have your title with the 
contract? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You never had the title to it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When you left Roanoke, what did you intend to do 
with the car? 
A. Trade it in on a 1939 Chevrolet. 
Q. You said you did intend to put it into taxi service. 
When did you form that intention? 
A. On February 13, when I got" the car back from Mr. 
·Wood. 
Q. That is the ·day you started to get the car ready and 
put it in shape for service, and you put the signs on it 011 
February 16? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And at that time, you did not have this permit or 
exemption card from Richmond? I mean from the State 
Corporation Commission. And you had not made applicatior 
for it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So the car could not have been put into service unt~t 
you got the card and your license. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you in:tended to put it in service after you go1 
it from Mr. Wood? 
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page 63 ~ A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Now, Mr~ Kelley, you stated you owed 
the Fulton Motor Company $210.00 when you bought the 
Dodge. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, it was financed for $200.000 by the Commercial 
Credit Company. 
A. Yes, I paid them the $10.00. At least I give them a 
note. 
Q. You gave them your p~rsonal note for $10.00 and 
paid it later? 
A. Yes. 
· Q. What was the price that you said you thought the 
Chevrolet was to cost you? · 
· A. I wasn't exactly certain about that. I thought arourid 
$780.00. 
Q. And the contract showed $868.00? 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you agreed to pay what the contract showed?. 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that shows you got credit of $350.00 for . the 
Dodge, and Mr. Wood was to pay off the contract with the 
Commercial Credit Company of $200.00? 
A. Yes. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Hunter: 
Q. I show you here a statement from the Fulton Motor 
Company in connection with the trade of the Ford for the 
Dodge. · Is that a copy of the statement you made for 
them? 
A. As far as I know it ts. 
Q. I see marked on the statement "T i t 1 e B 
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page 64 ~12-15361." You say you never got the papers 
that come with a car-the title? 
( Objection is made by Mr. Collins, who states it is com-
mon knowledge that the title goes with the conditional sales 
contract.) 
Q. The certificate of title to this Dodge car was turned 
over to the Commercial Credit Company at the time you 
bought it from the Fulton Motor Company? 
A. If it was on the papers to get the car, it was. 
Q. You know that the lien is stamped on the certifiate of 
title? 
A. On the regular title? 
Q. On the certifiate of title. 
A. No, sir, I didn't know that .. 
Q. You don't know anything about it, do you, whether 
you got a certificate of title to the Dodge or not? 
.A. No, sir. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
Mr. Henry Wood, another witness of lawful age, being 
duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. Your name is Henry Wood, is it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you are the owner of the Wood-Hammond Com-
1,any? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you been located in Clifton Forge? 
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A. About four years. 
page 65 ~ Q. And you have been selling Chevrolets for 
that entire time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know Mr. E. G. Kelley? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he approach you sometime in the first part of this 
year, or prior to that, with reference to trading you a 
Ford automobile for a Chevrolet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall any part of the agreement, of what 
you off erred to give him? 
A. I don't remember exactly the figures I gave him, but 
T do remember he didn~t think it was quite enough for the 
car. It was probably between two and three hundred, 
somewhere. 
Q. Do you recall that while you and Mr. Kelley were 
talking about a trade on. this Ford, whether or not he men-
tioned anything to you about a Dodge? 
A. Yes, he said that he was on a deal for a Dodge, and 
I told him to go ahead and trade for that Dodge, and I could 
probably give him a better proposition then. 
Q. You couldn't allow him so much on the Ford, and 
he told you he had a proposition on a Dodge, and you told 
him to go ahead and trade for the Dodge, and that you 
thought you could allow him more money on the Dodge than 
on the Ford? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he bring you a Dodge? 
A. Yes. 
__ Q. Do you recall the date when you first saw this Dodge? 
A. I don't recall exactly. It was around a-
page 66 ~bout the first of the year, around the first of 
February, somewhere about that time. 
Q. Where did you first see the Dodge? 
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A. Up at his house. 
Q. How did you go up to his house and who was with 
you? 
A. We went up in my car. He was with me. 
Q. What was your purpose· in going up there? 
A. To look the car over and appraise it. 
Q. To figure out the allowance on a trade with you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Kelley has testified that this Dodge was turned 
over to him on January 31, and on ~ ebruary 1, he got in 
touch with you and you went up to his house. According 
to what you say, it was around the first of February? 
A. I don't remember the date exactly. It was about 
that time. 
Q. Did you and Mr. Kelley then talk over the terms of 
a trade on a Chevrolet? 
(Mr. Hunter objects to this question as having nothing 
on earth to do with the liability here in question.) 
(Judge Hade~ temporarily overrules the objection.) 
Q. When was that car delivered to you, and did you make 
a trade on a Chevrolet with Mr. Kelley? . 
A. We made an agreement to trade on the Chevrolet. 
(Mr. Hunter objects "not only to this question and an-
swer and the former questiqn, but to any testimony along 
this line of dealing with the trade.") 
Q. Now, I hand you a Preferred Delivery Order and ask 
you if that is a copy of the order from your firm. 
page 67 t A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Will you state what the date on that order 
is? 
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A. That is the ·4th of February, 1939. 
Q. Now,, -at the time that order was drawn and written 
up and the terms agreed to by you and Mr. Kelley, did he 
deliver /the Dodge to you? 
A:.,-·1'Jo, sir, he didn't at the time we agreed on the terms 
i9,--/that order. 
L Q. At the date of that order, I say. 
. A. Yes, as well as I remember, the car was placed in the 
garage that day. 
r 
.' Q. Isn't it a fact that you and Mr. Kelley agreed to the 
ttrms but did not fill out the contract until the Dodge was 
!delivered to you? . 
/ A. Yes. 
Q. Then on the 4th day of February, you signed that 
bill of sale, or the Preferred Delivery Order? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The car was in your possession. on the· 4th of Feb-
ruary, then? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this the same form of order blank used by all 
dealers in selling automobiles? 
.A. Practically the same. There may be variations in 
some instances. 
Q. When Mr. Kelley signed this order, then he purchased 
a Chevrolet from you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You then purchased a Dodge from him? 
page 68 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I belive this is all in your handwriting, 
with the exception of Mr. Kelley's signature. 
--·-A. Yes. · 
Q. This is the delivery order from the Dodge to you and 
the Chevrolet to Kelley, as soon as you could get it? 
A. Yes, that's right. 
Q. At the time this trade was made with you, did Mr. 
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Kelley tell you that he had a $200.00 outstanding balance 
due to the Commercial Credit Company on this Dodge? 
A. Yes, he told me he traded cars over there for the 
difference of $200.00. 
Q. I wish you would look at this contract and see if there 
is a memorandum of that on there. ·' 
' A. Yes. The dealer agrees to pay the $200.00-to tb1e 
Commercial Credit Company. ; 
Q. Did you call the Commercial Credit Company at th/at 
time and check on that? { 
A. No, I took his word for it. I did call them later. \ 
Q. $200.00 was the. amount that he owed, plus th~ 
finance charges, was it not? \ 
A. Yes. 
Q. With reference to the finance charge, how much does 
it cost you to pay off that charge? 
A. Finance charges vary. Some have different charges. 
However, as well as I remember, I asked them the amount it 
cost to pay off a contract with that company, and it is 
usually $11.00 or $12.00. 
page 69 ~ Q. In other words, under this contract you had 
with Kelley, regardless of the contract with the 
Commercial Credit Company on the Dodge car, you could 
have paid off the $212.00, and gotten the title? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Within what period, do they allow you to do that? 
A. Sometimes they say maybe 12, 15, or 30 days. 
Q. Isn't it generally thirty days? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You could have taken up the contract on the Dodge 
car for the $212.00, any time within thirty days, then? 
A. I· don't remember just how long they gave me, but I 
planned to pay it off within the period of time they allowed. 
Q. Isn't it a practice with the dealer when they have a 
situation like this to let the contract run as long as he 
can until he has a sale for that particular car? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. When you took this car in, did you do any work on 
it? After you took the car in, did you do anything to it? 
A. Yes. There is always a little work to do on those 
cars. They have to be cleaned, or greased, and usually a 
polish job done when they come in. 
Q. I hand you here a statement, asking you what that 
statement is. I will ask you if this is not your original book 
entry as to what you did to this Dodge car. · 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. What does that enfry show with reference to whom the 
car belonged? 
page 70 r A. At the time the order was written, the car 
belonged to me. 
Q. What is the date of that order? 
A. Second month and the 9th. 
Q. Is that the date on which the repairs and the greasing 
was done on the car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The car was in your possession from the 4th until the 
9th before you did anything to it? 
A. Yes. When we get a car in, we don't necessarily. 
start to work on it the day we get it in. Sometimes it is 
fifteen days before we do anything to it. 
Q. This order shows the car was in your possession then 
from the 4th until the 9th before you did anything to it. 
£¥hen did you do to it then? 
A. We washed, polished and greased it, and checked the 
battery and oil. 
Q. Does that order show that the greasing, etc., was 
charged to you? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And what department was that charged to? 
A. Used car department. 
Q. What is your purpose in keeping a record like this? 
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A. We keep accounts of the cost of every car in there, of 
all the work done on them, and charge it up to the car. 
Q. For your own records, for the purpose of giving you 
exactly what you have in .. the car when you go to sell it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Please state if that is your original. entry m your 
book. 
page 71 ~ A. Yes, it's the original work order. 
The name Wood-Hammond is scratched out 
on this order. Why? 
A. Mr. Kelley got the car when we traded back and 
tore up the agreement on the trade of automobiles, and, of 
course, this work I had done on the car, I asked him to pay 
for, and he did pay· for it, so instead of charging the work 
to the used car department, we charged it to him personally. 
Q. On what day did he pay you for this work?· 
A. The 13th of February. 
Q. Is that the date he took the car back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. According to that statement this car charged on your 
books as a used car, belonging to you, was transferred out 
. cf the used car department to E. G. Kelley, and charged to 
him? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And under an agreement between you and Mr. Kelley, 
you cancelled your order for a Chevrolet and traded back 
with him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I. would like to exhibit this original work order to the 
jury. Your Honor, this is the original from Mr. Wood's 
books and I would like to withdraw it and substitute a copy 
so he can keep his records straight. 
Judge: All right. 
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Q. Mr. Wood, is there anything unusual in a man making 
a double swap on a car trade, giving you one car and taking 
your car and trading it to someone else? 
(Objection is made to this question by Mr. Hunter as 
being immaterial.) 
page 72 r (Judge overrules objection temporarily, instruct-
ing witness to go ahead and answer the question.) 
A. No, sir, that is done-I won't say frequently, but it 
has been done. About four new Chevrolets have been 
traded for like this this year. 
Q. It is done more in second-hand car business than in 
new, is it not? 
A. Yes, I know of cases where a man buys a used car and 
trades within less than a week for another. 
Q. I will ask you to file this exhibit as a part of your 
e::vidence, and make a copy of it so you can withclra w the 
original. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Isn't it a fact that what has been introduced here-I 
didn't see .the number of the exhibit-called the Preferred 
Delivery Order, is nothing more or less than an order for · 
a car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is not for any specific car? 
A. No, that is not on the blank, but it is stated. 
Q. For no car with a certain motor number? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't content that title can pass from you to 
Kelley for any specific car under that order, do you? 
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A. I didn't deliver any particular car. They aren't titled 
until after they are sold. 
Q. You execute what is know as an invoice, do you 
not? 
page 73 r A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have a paper similar to this one 
called a car invoice on the Fulton Motor Company? ( Hold-
ing a blank . invoice.) Isn't that kind of paper executed 
at the time a car is sold ? 
A. Yes, that is one form of invoice. I don't execute those 
all the time at the time of the sale of a car. When I write 
those orders up on that invoice there, and make two copies, 
and sometimes we'll deliver it to the customer four or 
five days later. 
Q. That is your original record of the sale of the car? 
A. Yes, the record of the sale and the delivery of the 
car. 
Q. On this particular car, did you agree to pay him any 
certain amount in cash for his car or take it in for a 
certain amount on a trade? 
A. I agreed to take it in on a certain amount on a trade. 
Q. When he came in and told you he didn't want this 
new car, is it your contention that he could have made you 
pay him $550.00 to keep that car. 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. He ordered a new car and came in and cancelled the 
order for it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q.Mr. Wood, I want to ask you if you are not mistaken 
about the car being delivered to you on February 4, the date 
this order was made out. Wasn't it three or four days later 
that he brought the car in, after you sent word that you had 
a prospect and you didn't want him to be using it for a taxi 
over the streets there? 
A. No, the day the order was written, the car 
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page 74 ~was left in there. He may have come back a 
day or two later and gotten the car to go some-
where in. 
Q. He may have come back and gotten it? 
A. He may have done it. I know that I just -delivered him 
a car the other day and he had to wait on this car and I let 
him use a car in the meantime sometime, and I didn't know · 
when he got it or when he brought it back. 
Q. Mr. Wood, do you know Mr. Gentry? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The representative of the Maryland Casualty Com-
pany? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He came and interviewed you about this, did he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you gave him a written statement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I want to show you the statement and ask you if that 
is your signature, and if this is the statement you made to 
him? 
A. That's my signature. 
Q. Do you recall giving him this statement? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I want to read from this statement and ask you if 
it is correct. I will show you the statement and read the first 
paragraph on page 3. "Concerning the delivery date· to 
t•S of the Dodge car by Mr. Kelley, I think it was several 
days after the order of Feb. 4, 1939 was given that Mr. 
Kelley delivered the car to us. I had a prospect for the car 
and I didn't want Mr. Kelley to drive it around in taxi 
service. I saw him a couple of times about this, 
page 75 ~and about February 7, 1939, one of his men 
brought the car to us." That is contained in the 
statement you gave Mr. Gentry. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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(Mr. Collins objects to the witness' not reading the en-
tire statement.) 
(Mr. Parsons hands him the statement to read.) 
A. Yes, that's the .statement I gave him. On the day 
we made the agreement, on the day we made the trade, 
it wasn't written up. We made the agreement the morning 
we went up to his house, and he bought the car, and then 
he came by the garage on the 4th and left the car there 
and the order was· written, and as I say, if he came by there 
to get a car, he possibly did take this one--,-if I made this 
statement, he must have gotten the car out of the garage. 
Just like this last case. Any of the salesmen will let him 
have one of the cars. Thi_s car in this last case was three or 
four weeks coming in, and I couldn't deprive him of the 
use of an automobile as long as he was going to buy one from 
ine. This last time, he took different cars out. Part of the 
time he had a Chevrolet roadster and sometimes a Ford 
Sedan, and in this particular case, he possibly did have the 
car. I believe I did say he had it out one afternoon or one 
day, and I called him up and I did have a chance to sell 
the car, so I asked him to bring it in. Sometimes we have 
as many as twenty to thirty used ·cars, and right now, I 
couldn't tell you what used cars are in the garage, there. 
·Q. What about yom_.. statement about not wanting him 
to use it in taxi service? 
A. Just what I say. 
page 76 ~ Q. You didn't want him to drive it around as 
a taxi? 
A. No, sir, although, I couldn't definitely say he was 
using it for a taxi. I joke with him about those kind. of 
things sometime. I don't know whether he was using it 
for a taxi or not. 
Q. You never saw anyone actually pay him? 
0 
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A. No, sir. I don't watch to see if he is hauling any busi-
ness. 
Q. You have enough to look after of your own. 
A. Yes, sir 
Q. But you were sufficiently concerned to send for the car 
to keep him fom using it for taxi service? 
A. I knew this old gentleman down at Clifton Forge, and 
:f wanted to sell him and was anxious to trade for this car. 
He waited a long time, and finally got a Chrysler, but I 
.happened to think of it and that there was a good chance to 
sell this car. · 
Q. This was a good prospect, and you didn't want to ruin 
it by selling him a taxi? 
A. Well, I wouldn't want anyone else to be driving the 
car. 




By Mr. Collins: 
Q. I would like to get the entire statement read to the jury, 
Mr. Wood, you have identified this as your statement, but 
it is not written in your handwriting. 
A. Probably it was written up and then I signed it. I 
didn't read it over, and I just took for granted that it was 
all right because he had asked me those questio~s 
page 77 ~and I answered what I thought was right, and 
then I signed it when he got through writing it. 
Q. I want to read this entire statement to the jury. "Feb-
ruary 24, 1939. H. C. Wood, Clifton Forge, Virginia, Own-
~r of \iVood-Hammond Chevrolet Company of Clifton 
·Fora;e. Concerning a transaction with E. G. Kelley, of Clif-
0 
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ton Forge, we agreed to allow Kelley $550.00 for a 1937 
Dodge Sedan on the purchase of a new Chevrolet, delivery 
to be made in April, 1939, or about the first of April. This 
contract was made on February 4, 1939. On February 9, 
1939, we did some repair work on the car, washing and pol-
ishing it. The car was delivered to us on February 4, 1939, 
th€. date of the order. Later Mr. Kelley decided that he 
was not going through with the trade and asked for his Dodge 
back. He paid the repair bill of $3.00 and the Dodge 
was delivered back to Mr. Kel1ey on February 13, 1939. 
At the time Mr. Kelley came for his car, he called his of-
fice and told one of his drivers to bring license tags up to 
our place of business to put on the Dodge. I am not positive, . 
but I believe that the tags which were put on the Dodge 
· were "H" or taxi tags. I could not say this under oath but 
my best recollection of the matter makes me think that "H" 
tags were put on the Dodge before it was driven out of 
011r garage.. It was no fault of the Wood-Hammond Com-
pany that Mr. Kelley backed down on his contract. We 
were going to make delivery of the new car on about April 
1, as per our agreement, but Mr. Kellley cancelled the order. 
Concerning the delivery date to us of the Dodge car by Mr. 
Kelley, I think it was several days after the or-
page 78 rder of February 4, 1939 was given that Mr. Kelley 
delivered the car to us. I had a prospect for 
the car and I didn't want Mr. Kelley to drive it a-
round in taxi service. I saw .him a couple of times about 
this and about February 7, 1939 one of his men brought 
the car to us. When he brought the Dodge to our garage 
for us to look it over, it had "H" tags on it. I have seen 
the Dodge sitting in front of Mr. Kelley's place of business 
but I do not recall seeing any passengers in the Dodge. H. 
C. Wood". Mr. Wood, do you know whose handwriting 
the body of this statement is in? 
A. Mr. Gentry wrote that. He took down the statement 
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Q. He is the insurance adjuster? 
A. I believe he is. 
Q. Mr. Kelley, about this invoice shown you by Mr. 
Hunter. That is a delivery invoice, setting up the exact 
amount of the trade and the payment after the delivery of 
the car, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The actual sale is made by the order blank which you 
c1nd Mr. Kelley signed? · 
A. That's the sale. 
Q. The contract for the sale? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now if Mr. Kelley had asked you for the $550.00 for 
this car, you would have said "No". 
A. Yes. 
Q. But if you got the Chevrolet when he asked you to~ 
you would have had to have given him that amount, wouldn't 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. From this statement, it appears that when 
page 79 ~you take a man's car in, you of ten let him use it 
or lend them other cars belonging to you, until 
you can get · him his car? 
A. Yes, it is necessary when I can't make deliveries right 
away. 
Q. You knew :Mr. Kelley was in the taxi business? 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Did you know what cars of his were used for his 
taxi business and what ones for private cars? 
A. Well I-it would be pretty hard to say. He had a 
1937 Chevrolet . . . 
Q. Do you know exactly what cars he used in the taxi 
business and which he did not? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In your statement you say the time the Dodge car 
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was delivered was· the 4th day of February, the date the 
order was signed for the ·new Chevrolet. From that day 
on, the car belonged to you? 
A. \Tes. · 
Q. And if he brought the car back on the 7th, it was be-
cause you, or one of your salesmen, had loaned him the 
Dodge? 
A. \Tes. 
Q. \Tou had an idea of selling the car and didn't want 
it to be used in the taxi service, but you could not definitely 
say it was being used? · 
A. No, sir. · 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. \Tou stated, Mr. Wood, in answer to Mr. Collins's 
question as to who owned this car, that you did. \T ou are 
simply giving your opinion as to the ownership, are you 
not? 
page 80 ~ A. I have never seen the title on it. 
Q. You simply say it was your car because 
it was delivered to you? 
A. That's right. 
Q. No title was delivered to you, was it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. The title was with the Commercial Credit Company, 
was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \T ou never got a title for the car? 
A. No,· sir. 
Q. You never delivered a title to any car growing out 
of this transaction to Mr. Kelley, did you? 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. All that happened was that you simply took an order 
for a car and the deal was cancelled by Mr. Kelley? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't deny the accuracy or truth of the state-
ment that was read, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It was fresher in your mind then than now, was it 
not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was made on February 24? 
A. Yes. Mr. Gentry lent me a copy and I destroyed it 
because I wasn't interested particularly in it. 




By Mr. Collins: 
page 81 r Q. After the 4th day of February, if you had 
had a purchaser for that Dodge, would you not 
have sold it to the man? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in order to get the title, you would have taken 
up the balance with the Commercial Credit Company, and 
gotten the title and transferred it to the purchaser? 
A. Yes. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
E. A. Gentry, another witness of lawful age, having been 
duly sworn, does testify as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
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Q. Your name is E. A. Gentry? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are the adjuster for the Maryland Casualty Com-
pany? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. I hand you this Delivery Order, referred to in this 
case, and ask you if that was not received by you from Mr. 
Kelley. 
A. Yes, on Februray 18, 1939, when I came to Clifton 
Forge to investigate this accident. 
Q. The day after the accident occurred? 
A. Yes, sir 
Q. And this order has been in your possession, or the 
company's ever since? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I would like for you to introduce this De-
page 82 ~livery Order as an exhibit in this case. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
C. B. Potter, another witness of lawful age, having been 
duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. What are your initials, Mr. Potter? 
A. C. B. Potter? 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Potter? 
A. Waynesboro, Va. 
Q. Have you frequently visited in Clifton Forge? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have a number of friends there? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Were you in the car with Mr. Blankenship at the time 
of the accident in which Clifton Toney was injured? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where were you going? 
A. I was coming up to Covinton with Mr. Blankenship. 
Q. Do you know why he was ma~ing that trip? 
A. For some parts for an automobile. 
Q. Were you coming along as a passenger in the car? 
A. I was just coming along for the ride coming up with 
him. 
Q. Was it your intention to ride back to Clifton Forge 
with him? 
A. That's right. 
page 83 r Q. Do you know what kind of a car you were 
in ~t the time? 
A. Yes, it was a Dodge. 
Q. A Dodge car ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there anyone else m the car besides you and 
M:r. Blankenship? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You have stated that you did not pay anything for 
the ride, that you were not a passenger in the car, but were 
just riding along for the ride, or because you were there 
when Mr. Blankenship left. Is that right? 
A. I just happened to be there when he left, and he asked 
me to come along with him, which I did. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. You knew that the car had taxi signs on it, didn't 
you? 
A. Not at that time, I didn't. I didn't know it at the 
time I got in it. 
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Q. You knew later that it had taxi signs on it. did 
you? 
A~ Yes. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
Mr. Carl Blankenship, another witness of lawful age, 
having been duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
page 84 r Q. What are your initials, Mr. Blankenship? 
A. Carl Blankenship-no middle name. 
Q. You are one of the defendants and one of the parties 
against whom this judgment · was rendered with reference 
to this action, are you not? 
A. Yes . 
. Q. And you are the same Blankenship referred to in the 
Notice of Motion which Mr. Payne read, are you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Blankenship, how long before February 17, had 
you been working for Mr. Kelley? 
A. Well, some time-maybe three or four months. 
Q. You had been working for him some three or four 
months? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In what capacity? 
A. I was driving for him. 
Q. You drove a taxi for him? 
A. Yes, sir 
Q. In that taxi business, does he have drivers to work 
~hift work? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. That is, you work so many hours and then somebody 
else takes your car and works so many more, and eventual-
I y your turns comes again? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. On the morning on which this accident occurred, in 
which Clifton Toney was injured, did you start to Coving-
ton in a car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what kind of a car did you come to Covington, 
Q. And what kind of a car did you come to 
page 85 rCovington, or start to Covington, in? 
A. I started in a 1937 Dodge Sedan. 
Q. And the reason you didn't get here was because of 
this accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there anyone with you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who was it? 
A. Mr. ·Potter. . 
Q. How did it happen that he was with you? 
A. Well, about a week or so before, he come to Clifton 
and I got him off the train and hauled him about seventy-
five cents' worth in town, and just met .him, and then I 
saw him across the street that morning and just asked him 
if he wanted to ride up with me. I had seen him a couple 
· of times around· town, and I just asked him if he wanted 
to ride up with me. 
Q. You knew him, then? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time did you leave Clifton Forge? 
A. Well, I met Number Four. 
Q. About what time did you leave? 
A. About 8 :20, I guess. 
Q. You say Mr. Potter was just standing there? 
A. He was standing across the street there when I got 
in the car. 
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Q. And you asked him to come alqng? 
A. I hollered and asked him "Do you want to ride to 
Covington and catch a little air?" and he said 
"Yes". 
page 86 ~ Q. Was there any agreement that he was to 
do anything for you for bringing him up here? 
A. No, he just came along to keep me company. 
Q. Who had authorized you to come to Covington this 
particular morning? 
A. Mr. Kelley. 
Q. What did he tell you to do? 
A. I was coming to get a bumper grill for the Dodge. 
Q. That is a thing that attaches to the bumper and goes 
up in front of the grill or the radiator to protect it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did Mr. Kelley tell you to do with reference to 
coming to Covington? 
A. He told me when I got off from work to take the 
Dodge and get the bumper grill for it. I worked at night 
and the other driver came and taken my car and let me 
off. 
Q. You drove a taxi all night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had this Dodge been used in the taxi business or in 
taxi service at any time? 
A. No, sir, not as I know of, not since we came over to 
Clifton. 
Q. I mean by you, or Mr. Kelley, or anyone there. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had the Ford car which was traded in Roanoke ever 
been used in taxi service? 
A. Not as I know of. 
Q. This Dodge car, when you came to Coving-
page 87 ~ton, or started to Covington, on this particular 
morning, qid have taxi license on it, did it not? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did it have taxi signs painted on it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know ,,vhen those signs were painted on the 
l)odge? 
A. The evening before I had the accident with it. 
Q. Do you know who put them on it? 
A. Mr. Hoffman. I don't know him personally, but I'. 
know him when I see him. 
Q. Mr. Hoffman put the sign on the car the day before 
Mr. Kelley instructed you to come to Covington to get this 
grill guard. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I think you said that no one was m the car except 
you and Mr. Potter. 
A. That's right. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. Twenty-two. 
Q. Twenty-two years old? 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Hunter: 
Q. Do you recall the Ford car being traded for the Dodge? 
A. I remember ,vhen it was traded for the Dodge. 
Q. Did you ever drive the Ford? · 
A. Sometimes when I had a date, or when Mr. Kelley and 
I came to Covington to tend to some business, I would drive 
him up. 
page 88 ~ Q. Did you ever observe the mileage on the 
Ford? 
A. I never drove it enough to pay any attention to it. 
Q. You don't know whether other drivers drove the Ford, 
or not, do you? 
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A. No, sir, I don't. 
Q. You don't know? 
A. No, sir. I think maybe sometime one might come 
with Mr. Kelley when he was on business; and drove it. 
Q. You had no instructions from Mr. Kelley as to the 
use of the Dodge for taxi service, did you? 
A. What do you mean? 
Q. He didn't give you any instructions as to not using 
it for taxi service, did he? 
A. He told me ,ve couldn't use it for taxi service. We 
were always scared to ask him why not, unless you had a 
lot of nerve because he always gave us the devil, and he 
would tell us he was running the place and he would tend 
to his business. 
Q. Had you ever driven this car before the morning of 
this accident? 
A. I think I had driven it up to his. house. I think it 
was the same evening he got it. I was over there with 
him. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
Mr. H. L. Land, Jr., another witness of lawful age, 
having been duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
1,age 89 ~ By Mr. Hunter: 
Q. Mr. Land, with whom are you connected in business? 
A. Commercial Credit Company, in Roanoke. 
Q. That is a branch office in Roanoke? 
A. \Tes, sir. . 
Q. What is the nature of your business? 
A. Discount business with automobile dealers. 
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Q. Do you recall anything connected with a trade by 
Mr. Kelley and the Fulton Motor Company where Mr. 
Kelley acquired a 1937 Dodge automobile? 
A. No, sir, I am not familiar with how he got it. 
Q. y OU do know that he got a Dodge automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was any insurance effected on the Dodge automobile 
for the protection of the holder, or. 4olders, of the ·deferred 
purchase money? 
A. Yes, sir, for the protection of Mr. Kelley and our-
selves. 
Q. To what use was it reported the Dodge would be 
put? 
A. A taxi cab. 
Q. When a paper of that kind is financed, where does the 
certificate of title go and is held until the money is paid? 
A. At the time the sale is consummated, the dealer is 
supposed to have title for the merchandise, and he for-
wards it to the Division of Motor Vehicles, and they hold 
it until payment. 
Q. The lien is shown on the certificate, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't have that now, do you? 
page 90 r A. No, sir. It is not titled in Mr. Kelley's 
name. 
Q. Do you have a record of the transfer? 
A. The car was titled in the name of ... (Looking at a 
memorandum.) 
(Mr. Collins objects to witness testifying from a mem-
orandum instead of the record, itsel[) 
(Mr. Hunter answers that their records will show to 
whom title was issued.) 
(Mr. Collins looks at witness' papers.) 
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(Judge instructs Mr. Hunter to continue with his ques-
tions.) 
Q. Do you records show that a certificate of title to this 
particular Dodge automobile was ever in Wood-Hammond 
Company? 
A. No. 
(Mr. Collins objects to this question and answer, saying 
that the Commercial Credit Company has no records and 
no way of knowing whose names title has been in.) 
(Mr. Hunter excepts to this, saying their records show 
in lvhose name title has been up until the last issuance.) 
(Judge: "His records may, or may not show that".) 
( In absence of records, Judge instructs ·counsel to continue.) 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. Of co1:,1rse, your only interest in this was financing the 
contract. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you with the company at the time this con-
tract was financed and have you been with them smce 
then? 
page 91 ~ A. Yes, I was with them in the first of 1939. 
Q. On this contract on the Dodge car, which 
must have come into your office on February 2, or the 1st, 
how much would it cost to pay that contract off in thirty 
days? 
A. It depends on the amount of the contract and the in-
terest involved. 
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Q. It depends on those things? There is not set rule? 
A. No. I can't say about any one contract without see-
ing our records on that particular contract. 
·witness leaves the stand. 
Judge: Court is adjourned until tomorrow mornmg at 
10 :00 o'clock. 
November 29, 1939. Court convened at 10 :00 o'clock. 
Mr. Collins : The plaintiff rests. 
Mr. Hunter: I want to make a motion before the Court 
Judge Haden instructs the jury to retire to their room. 
Mr. Hunter : "The defendants moves that the evidence 
of the plaintiff be stricken on the following grounds : 
First: the testimony is uncontradicted that notice was 
not given to the insurance company within the ten days af-
ter the delivery of the Dodge automobile to Mr. Kelley, and, 
therefore, under the policy of insurance, the insurance, if 
any, automatically expired prior to the date of the 
page 92 raccident in which Clifton Toney was injured; 
Second : the Dodge automobile never passed 
into the ownership of Wood-Hammond Company at all be-
t·ause under the statute and the decisions in this State.. the 
absolute ownership remained in Mr. Kelley until there had 
been delivered to the \Vood-Hammond Company a certifi-
cate of title duly assigned to the Wood-Hammond Company; 
And third: there is uncontradicted testimony that the 
use to which the Dodge automobile was to be put was that 
of a taxi, or, in other words, a car for the carrying of pas-
sengers for compensation, contrary to the delcaration in the 
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policy as to what the use of the car should be; and that the 
Dodge car could not be classified for the same use the Ford 
automobile was to be put under the policy; 
And fourth : although, in the absence of the statute and 
decisions referred to, the Dodge might have become the prop-
erty of the Wood-Hammond Company, nevertheless, a 
repurchase of the Dodge automobile by Mr. Kelley from 
that Company would have to be treated as a wholly dif-
ferent car which would not supplant the car described in 
the policy, according to the P.rovisions thereof, but would 
supplant the Dodge under its prior purchase from the Ful-
ton Motor Companj." 
Counsel for the defendant argues the points made in the 
motion by cousel for the plaintiff. 
Judge: "Motion overruled." 
Counsel for the plaintiff excepts to the ruling of the Court. 
on the grounds stated in the motion. 
page 93 ~ The jury returns to the Courtroom. 
Mr. D. M. Grove, another witness of lawful age, hav-
ing been duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Hunter: 
Q. I believe your name is D. M. Grove? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What business are you in, Mr. Grove? 
A. Insurance. 
Q. Are you the local agent for the Maryland Casulty 
Company? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Where are you located? 
A. Clifton Forge. 
Q. The policy of insurance in evidence in this case covers 
a Ford automobile owned by Mr. Kelley. Was that policy 
procured from you by Mr. Kelley? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. A part of the policy, and one of the declarations there""'. 
in, I find as follows : "The purposes for which .the auto-
mobile is to be used are pleasure and business, excluding the 
rnrrying of passengers for .a consideration". Who made 
that declaration to you? 
A. Mr. Kelley. 
Q. Mr. Kelley stated on the stand that prior to the time 
of the issuance of the policy and its delivery to him, that 
you were cognizant of the Ford's having taxi 
page 94 ~signs on it. Please state whether or not that is 
correct. 
A. I don't know whether it had taxi signs on it or not. 
Mr. Kelley asked for rates on a private passenger. car, and 
I told him they were around about $25.00, and he said he 
wanted insurance on a private car, that he was going to 
take it out of the taxi service, and he didn't want to pay 
$80.00 for a taxi when he was going to take the car out of 
service. 
Q. Did you see the automobile? 
A. I seen it when I got the numbers off of it. I went up 
to his home and the car was parked on the side street and 
I got the numbers off of it. 
Q. He told you he was going to take the car out of the 
taxi service ? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is the difference between the rates on a private 
car and on a taxi? 
A. At that time, for business and pleasure, it was around 
$25.00 or $28.00, and $80.00 on a taxi. 
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Q. Did you know anything about the acquisition of· this 
Dodge car? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When vvas the first time you found out that Mr. Kel-
.}ey had acquired a Dodge? 
A. The afternoon of the day of the wreck. 
Q. How was that? 
A. I come to Covington and looked at the Dodge car in 
the garage, down there. 
Q. Neither Mr. Kelley, nor anyone else, notified you be-
fore the wreck? 
page 95 r A. He did, just before we come to Covington 
to look at the car. 
Q. That was after the wreck happened? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see the Dodge? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What kind of tags did it have on it? 
A. I don't know. I didn't see any on it. I looked at the 
front of the car and didn't see any tag on it at all and I 
just presumed that they had taken them off or they had been 
knocked off in the wreck. 
Q. That was sometime after the wreck? 
A. That was in the afternoon. The wreck was in the 
morning and that was in the afternoon of the same day, I 
saw the car. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins : 
Q. Mr. Grove, the premium under this policy that has 
been ref erred to, would be the same on this Ford car as on 
any other Ford car, would it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As a private car? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. On any other car, except the higher priced cars, the 
premium would be th~ same? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Kelley did see you with reference to buying a 
policy on this car, did he not ? 
page 96 r A. Yes~ 
Q. Mr. Grove, did you have a conversation 
with Mr. Kelley along in January of this year with re-
ference to trans£ erring this policy? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. You may have had a conversation, but you don't re-
call it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Kelley notified you the morning of the accident, 
or about noon of that day, about the Dodge? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you notified the adjuster of the Maryland Casual-
ty Corppany, in Staunton? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that afternoon, you and Mr. Kelley came to Cov-
ington to look at the car ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Kelley was with you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you didn't see any tags on the car, or you weren't 
particularly looking for them? 
A. No, sir, I just got the number off the engine. 
Q. And didn't you fill out a transfer paper for the 111-
surance? 
A. Yes, and I notified the company. 
Q. You filled out the papers trans£ erring the msurance 
from the Ford to 'the Dodge? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't you see taxi signs on the D9dge car at the 
garage? 
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A. No, sir. 
page 97 ~ Q. You mean they were not on the car, or 
that you just didn't look for them? 
A. I don't know-the car was in a dark place there m 
the garage and I didn't go around to look at it. 
Q. You just got the engine number off of it? 
A. Yes. I had a flashlight with me and I just looked at 
the engine and got the number and wrote it down. 
Q. You were at the hearing when Blankenship was tried 
for reckless driving, and you testified in that case, didn't 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you testified that you were the agent of· the 
Maryland Casualty Company and that you had written the 
policy on this Ford car? 
A. I did. . 
Q. And that the Dodge car was insured at the time of 
the accident? 
-A .. I don't know whether it was insured or not. 
Q. Do you recall the date of this hearing of Blankenship 
for reckless driving as being March 4? 
A. I don't remember what day it was. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Hunter: 
Q. Mr. Grove you have made a statement about Mr. Kel-
ley asking you to transfer the insurance on this car after 
the a~cident. 
(Mr. Collins objects to this question because Mr. Grove 
has not testified that Mr. Kelley asked him to transfer the 
insurance.) 
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the transfer. 
A. Well, Mr. Kelley came in and asked me to transfer 
the insurance from the Ford to the Dodge, that he had traded, 
and he told me about the accideµt and I said "Why didn't 
you notify me sooner ?" and he said "I just traded the car 
in Roanoke, and got it in last night", so I went ahead and 
notified the Company to make the trans£ er. 
Q. The Maryland Casualty Company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You notified the General Agent that Mr: Kelley want-
ed to trans£ er this insurance? 
(Mr. Collins objects to this question as being leading.) 
Q. Was the trans£ er ever made? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you ever see any transfer? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did. you ever transfer it? 
A. No, sir. I simply notify them. I get the motor num-
bers and ask them to make the transfer. 
Q. When did Mr. Kelley tell you he had traded for the 
Dodge? 
A. The day of the accident, somewhere around about 
noon. 
Q. When did he say he got the Dodge? 
A. The- day before. 
Q. Where? 
A. In Roanoke. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
. By Mr. Collins: 
page 99 ~ Q. Mr. Grove, was any part of the premium 
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under this policy, returned to Mr. Kelley? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You know that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You do not make transfer, yourself? 
A. No, sir. I don't write the policies. The Maryland 
Casualty Company-the General Agent at Staunton-
\vrites the policies and makes the transfers and returns them 
to me. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
E. A. Gentry, again called to the stand, testifies as fol-
lows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Hunter: 
Q. What are your initials, Mr. Gentry? 
A. E. A. 
Q. What business are you engaged in? 
A. I am an adjuuster for the Maryland Casualty Com-
pany. 
Q. Where are your headquarters, Mr. Gentry? 
A. Staunton. 
Q. VVhen did you first receive any knowledge of the ac-
cident in which Clifton Toney was injured? 
A. We got a telephone call at the Staunton office on Feb-
ruary 17, and I came to Clifton Forge the next day,-that 
would be February 18. 
page 100 r Q. What did yott do when you got here? 
A. I made the usual routine investigation, go-
ing into the question of liability, trying to locate witnesses, 
examing the car involved in the accident as to the physical 
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damage to the car, making measurements at the scene of 
the accident for skid marks, talked to the State Trooper who 
investigated the accident, talked to and took a statement from 
j\.fr. Kelley, our assured, and from Mr. Blankenship. the 
driver of the car. 
Q. What is your authority on missions on this kind? 
A .. My authority is simply my duty to· make investiga-
tions. . . 
(Mr. Collins objects to this question and answer, saying 
it is not relevant "as he has no authority in any matter".) 
(Judge overrules the objection, to which Mr. Collins ex-
cepts.) 
A. I conduct the investigation and submit the facts to 
the company. 
Q. You have no authority to make a settlement? 
A. I have authority to make a settlement up to $250.00 
on the scene of the accident. 
Q. Did you make a report of your investigation in this 
accident? 
A .. To the company, yes. 
Q. Did you check as to whether or not the car involved 
in the accident was the one described in this policy? · 
A. When I came to Clifton, I didn't know what car we 
covered. I didn't know it was a Ford car at this time. 
When I got here Mr. Kelley said the Dodge was damaged, 
and when I went to Mr. Grove, I learned that our policy 
covered a Ford car. Then I got notice of the Dodge car, 
so, of course, I had to point out to the home office that it 
wasn't the same car in the policy. 
page 101 r Q. Diel you make that report? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did the Dodge have taxi signs on it when you saw 
it? 
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A. Yes, when I inspected it on Saturday, February 18, 
in tJ:ie garage. 
Q. What kind of tags were on the car? 
A. I don't believe I could answer that question. If my 
recollection 1s right, the tags had been removed when I 
came here. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. Mr. Gentry, you say you came here on the 18th, and 
made this investigation and then made your report to your 
Company. 
A. I don't suppose you could call that a thorough in-
vestigation. I ran into a situation that I didn't anticipate! 
.and its being Saturday, I tried to get as much of the in-
formation as I. could at that time, and then the following 
week, I made another trip up here. 
Q. On what day of the following week were you here? 
A. I would like to ref er to my file and refresh my memory 
on that. If I remember correctly, it was on February 24. 
It was the next week that I came back. 
Q. When did you make your report to the Company? 
A. My initial report of the investigation, as we ca.11 them, 
is dated February 20, which would be Monday. 
Q. That was dated in Staunton? 
page 102 ~ A. Yes, that was sent from Staunton to the 
home office in Baltimore. 
Q. When did you make your final report? 
A. I have never made a final report. I have kept the 
Company advised. 
Q. You got sufficient information on your first trip, 
talking· to witnesses, to make your report, didn't you? · 
A. Not on my first trip. 
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Q. You talked to Mr. Kelley then, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And got a statement from Mr. Blankenship on that 
day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And from the State Officer? 
A. I didn't get a statement from him; I interviewed him. 
Q. And from Mr. Potter? 
A. No, sir, I didn't get a chance to talk to Mr. Potter 
because neither Mr. Kelley nor Mr. Blankenship knew of 
Mr. Potter's whereabouts or what he was doing in Cov-
ington, or Clifton Forge; and I was unable to locate him. 
Q. Did you ever locate him? 
A. I went to Waynesboro later and found him. Mr. 
Kelley found out later what Mr. Potter's address was, and 
told me he lived in Waynesboro. It was probably two weeks 
later that I saw him. 
Q. Have you been in Clifton Forge or Covington to in-
vestigate this accident, since the 24th of February? 
A. Yes, I talked to Mr. Wood of the Wood-Hammond 
Chevrolet Company, and took a statement from 
page 103 ~him. I believe that was after February 24. 
Q. The statement from Mr. Wood which has 
been filed as an exhibit here is dated February 24. 
A. I may have seen him at that time. 
Q. And that was the last time you came up here? 
A. It may possibly be so. I had to go to Roanoke and 
interview Mr. Childress, Mr. Manning and Mr. Painter 
over there. They are all of the Fulton Motor Company. 
Q. Those names you have jnst mentioned, you intervie,ved 
in Roanoke just recently to prepare for this trial, did you 
not? . · 
A. No, sir, I had to go into all the facts surrounding these 
transactions, had to get a copy of the bill of sale and of 
the record of the Fulton Motor Company; and that was 
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all clone during the third or fourth week following the 
accident, as soon as I could do it. 
Q. You were present on March 4 at the trial of Carl 
BJankenship for reckless driving, were you not? 
A. No, sir, if I remember correctly, I did make one trip 
up here too attend the hearing, but it ,vas postponed, and I 
never attended the criminal trial. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
Mr. M. S. Urick, another witness of lawful age, having 
been duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. What is your occupation, Mr. Urick? 
page 104 r A. I am a State Trooper assigned to this ter-
ritory. 
Q. How long have you been a State Trooper? 
A. Since July 15, 1936. 
Q. Since July, 1936? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What are your duties? 
A. I patrol the highways and Alleghany County west of 
Clifton Forge and am supposed to be ~esponsible for the 
enforcement of laws, and I investigate wrecks. 
· Q. Are you familiar with the laws on motor vehicles? 
A. Not thoroughly. 
Q. Are you familiar with the types of tags issued for 
cars? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What are "H" tags? 
A. For taxis. 
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(Mr. Collins objects to the interpretation of the law by 
an officer instead of the Court.) 
(Judge: "I think the statute covers that.") 
(Mr. Parsons: "I will be glad to read the statute.") 
(Mr. Collins objects to Mr. Parsons' reading the statute, 
stating it is his contention that the law is to be given by 
the Court.) 
(Judge states that he thinks the Jury understand the 
matter.) 
Q. Did you investigate this matter, or this accident, m 
which Clifton Toney was injured? 
A. Yes: 
Q. Did you see the car? 
A. Yes. 
page 105 r Q. How soon after the collusion happened did 
you see it? · 
A. I don't know exactly. I could tell you by looking at 
my notes. 
Q. Well, tell us approximately. 
A. Fifteen or twenty minutes. 
Q. What kind of tags were on the car? 
A. "H" tags, taxi tags. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not the car had taxi signs 
painted on it? 
A. There was one on the windshield, and there were two 
amber lights on the front of the radiator which designates 
cars as taxis. 
(Mr. Collins objects to this answer and asks that it be 
disregarded.) (After ar:gument, Mr. Collins withdraws 
objection.) 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. When you got to the scene of the accident, had Clifton 
Toney been taken to the hospital? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The car and the truck and the blood were still there? 
A. Yes. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
Mr. W. J. Perry, Jr., another witness of lawful age, 
having been duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
page 106 r By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. What busines are you in Mr. Perry? 
A. I am General Agent for the Maryland Casualty Com-
pany. 
Q. Where are you located? 
A. In Staunton. 
Q. What district is covered by your general agency? 
A. Western Virginia and West Virginia. 
Q. Does Mr. Grove come under your general agency? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There has been some testimony here that Mr. E. 
G. Kelley applied for a transfer of the insurance policy 
on the Ford in question to the Dodge. What authority 
does Mr. Grove have to make such a transfer? 
A. He has no authority to make that transfer. 
Q. Who does have such authority? 
A. That transfer would have to be made by the Company. 
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Q. Why is that? 
A. Because that was after the accident happened. 
Q. You mean because the application was made after the 
acident happened? 
A. Yes. The car was demolished and you can't write 
insurance on a car of that kind. 
Q. Can a -transfer of insurance be made by the local 
agent relating back beyond the time of the accident? 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. Mr. Perry, it is a fact that Mr. Grove did 
page 107 ~send you a request for a trans£ er for this in-
surance, is it not? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know whether or not the Company received 
it? 
A. I imagine they did in the claim department. 
Q. In other words, the Maryland Casualty Company did 
get a request for a trans£ er of the insurance? 
A. I won't answer that, because at the time the accident 
occurred, I had nothing to do with the case. 
Q. You had nothing whatsoever to do with it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know whether this claim department ever 
made the transfer or not? 
A. Well, no trans£ er could be made except through our 
office. 
. Q. You mean no trans£ er could be made on any policy 
after the date of the accident without your knowing it? 
A. Not without authority from the insurance company. 
Q. But the transfer, itself-the writing of it-has to 
go through the general agent's office? 
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A. Any transfer has to. 
Q. Whether before or after the accident, the transfer 
has to go through the general agent's office? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You are not undertaking to testify that Mr. Grove 
did not send in an application for the transfer of this 
insurance on this car, are you? 
A. None was sent to the general agent. 
Q. None was sent to you? 
A. Not to my office. 
page 108 f Q. YOU don't know whether it was sent to 
the claims department or the home office in Balti-
more or not? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You are not attempting to say he did or did not 
send it? 
A. I would have known if he had. 
Q. You have just said you had nothing to do with it at 
the time of the accident. 
A. Yes, I said that. I had nothing to do with it then 
whatever. If an application went in after the accident, I 
would have had something to do with it-if it had gone in. 
I was called on to do nothing after the accident was reported. 
Q. You had nothing to do with it after the accident was 
reported? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You have nothing to do with the statements, or any-
thing else, at that end of it? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You can't tell the Court and the jury whether an 
application was or was not sent in? 
A. I can't say anything about the application for the 
transfer. 
Q. You don't know a thing about that application? 
A. No, sir. 
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Witness leaves the stand. 
Mr. James M. Bugby, another witness of lawful age, 
having been duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Hunter: 
page 109 r Q. Give youi- full name, please. 
A. James M. Bugby. 
Q. What is your occupation, Mr. Bugby? 
A. I am Assistant Manager of the automobile department 
at the home office of the Maryland Casualty Company, in 
Baltimore. 
Q. I will ask you whether or not any request came into 
the home office of the Maryland Casualty Company for 
a transfer of this policy in question. 
(Mr. Collins objects to counsel for the plaintiff using 
one witness to contradict another of his witnesses who has 
already testified. "He is using· one agent of the company to 
contradict another.") 
CJ udge temporarily overrules the objection.) 
Q. Go ahead and answer the question. I started to ask 
you whether or not any application f ~r a trans£ er came into 
the home office, requesting a trans£ er of the insurance from 
the Ford to the Dodge? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. If any had come in, it would have come to your atten-
tion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are positive that no such application was made? 
A. No such application came into the home office. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins : 
Q. Where are you located, Mr. Bugby? 
A. In Baltimore, in the home office of the Company. 
Q. How many policies does the Maryland Casualty Com-
pany have? 
page 110 ~ A. How many policies of automobile insurance? 
Q. Yes. · 
A. I presume about one hundred thousand a ·year. 
Q. How many people are employed in the home office in 
Baltimore? 
A. In our department? 
Q. Yes, or in all the departments. 
A. About a thousand, I guess. 
Q. Do you attend, personally, to everything that comes 
into that office? 
A. No, I didn't say that. 
Q. Then do you say that none of these thousand people 
had any kind of an application for a trans£ er of this policy? _ 
A. The Company is departmental and certain things come 
to certain departments and certain people in those depart-
ments take care of them. I have been handling the business 
from Mr. Perry's office and the western district of Virginia 
and West Virginia. · · 
Q. Mr. Bugby, how can you. explain Mr. Groye's state-
ment that he sent this application in to your agent here, 
cmd how can you explain that you didn't get it? 
A. Well, I can't explain where it would have gone be-
tween the time he may have sent it. · 
Q. Isn't it possible that this application is in the hands 
of the claims department in Staunton? 
A. It would be possible. It might be anywhere. 
Q. Do you know whether or not it is in the claims depart-
ment in Staunton? 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clifton Toney et als. 117 
E. A. Gentry 
A. No, I don't know. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
page 111 r E. A. Gentry, again recalled to the stand, tes-
tifies as follows : · 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Hunter: 
Q. Mr. Gentry, Mr. Collins has asked if the application 
for the transfer of this policy is in the hands of the claims 
department in Staunton. 
A. None ever came in. There was simply an oral state-
ment by Mr. Grove that this car was not the car covered 
in the policy. 
Q. There was no written application? 
A. The only information the claims department had on 
that was .simply Mr. Grove's oral statement to me and Mr. 
Kelley's statement which I later took down in written form. 
Mr. Kelley made no request to me that it be transferred. 
Q. Did all this take place after the accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Grove tell you that Mr. Kelley asked for a 
transfer after the accident? 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. Mr. Gentry, it was not proper, and would not be proper 
for any assured to ask you to transfer a policy, would it? 
A. That's right. 
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Q. He should ask the agent from whom he bought the 
policy? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Don't you know, as a matter of fact, that 
page 112 ~a request for a transfer of this policy had been 
made to Mr. Grove and that Mr. Grove did all 
he could to effect that transfer? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You do not know that any transfer was asked for? 
A. The information that I got was that there had been 
no request for it. The morning when I came up here, after 
this accident happened, Mr. Grove said he had discovered 
after the accident was reported to him that the car in-
volved was not the car insured in our policy. A Dodge 
had been in the accident and a Ford was covered by the 
policy, and he just turned it over to me to straighten out. 
Q. Did he tell you that Kelley had asked for a trans£ er? 
A. He said he had not asked for it. I mean before the 
accident happened. In other words, after the accident hap-
pened, the request for a transfer wouldn't have been of any 
interest to me. I wouldn't have been concerned about that 
then-the horse was gone then. 
Q. I understand that you wouldn't have been interested in 
it, but did Mr. Grove tell you that a trans£ er had been 
asked for before or after the accident happened? 
A. He only told me that the trans£ er had not been asked 
for before the accident occurred. 
Q. After the accident happened, you investigated, and 
found that another car was involved, and Mr. Grove told 
you he had not asked for a trans£ er before the accident, but 
didn't mention about after the accident? 
A. Mr. Grove said "No, Mr. Kelley has not made a 
request for a trans£ er". 
Q. You are positive of that, and that he told you 
that? 
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page 113r A. That's right. 
Q. He said that after the accident when you . 
talked to him ? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Mr. Grove is wrong, then, in his testimony when· he 
said that Kelley did ask for a trans£ er after the accident 
and that he came up here to Covington and got the numbers 
off of the engine and sent the application in? 
A. I can't say about that. I say he didn't tell me that. 
Kelley may have asked for a transfer after the accident 
happened. · 
Q. You were up here on the 18th, and Mr. Grove said he 
came up to Covington the 17th and took the numbers off 
the car and sent in for a transfer. Your conversation with 
him was on the day you say you saw the car; and you tell 
the Court that he said "No, Mr. Kelley has not asked for a 
trans£ er" ? · 
A. That's right. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
A. H. Pait, another witness of lawful age, having been 
duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
(Mr. Collins objects to Mr. Pait's testifying due to the 
fact that he has stayed in the Courtroom all of this day, 
when he was instructed, with the other witnesses, that he 
was to be excluded from the Courtroom.) (Jury instructed 
to retire to their room.) 
(Point is argued by counsel for both sides, Mr. Hunter 
saying he will agree to a new trial if Mr. Collins so desires.) 
{Mr. Collins finally withdraws his objection.) 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
page 114 r By Mr. Hunter.: 
Q. Mr. Pait, what is your occupation? 
A. I am in supervisory capacity in the claims depart-
ment of the Company. 
Q. Where are you located? 
A. In Staunton. 
Q. It is in testimony here that a postcard was sent to 
Mr. Kelley, mailed on the 20th; acknowledging receipt of 
notification of this accident which occurred on the 17th. 
Please state ~he circumstances under which that postcard 
\Vas mailed to him? 
A. That procedure is just routine. It goes out on every 
claim report that we get. 
Q. It acknowledges receipt of the report of ·the accident 
and instructs the assu_red to send all papers served on him 
to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is just a regular form? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In further testimony here, it is stated that you wrote 
two letters to Mr. Kelley in which there was a denial of 
coverage under the policy, one of which was dated March 
24, and the other dated March 24, 1939-I mean March 
14 and 24. Is this letter with this brown envelope attached 
one of your letters ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this also? ( Showing him letter dated March 14.) 
A. Yes. Both the letter of the· 14th and the 24th are 
my letters. 
Q. Will you please explain the interval of time between the 
accident and your letter of March 14 and your subsequent 
letter of March 24? 
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].Jage 115 r A. Do you want me to explain the procedure 
we go through? 
Q. Yes. Explain why this length of time expired. 
A. When I send an adjuster out, he makes a report and 
submits it to me. I study. the report, and find whether or 
not it is sufficiently complete to submit it to the home office. 
If there is anything lacking in the report, I see that it is 
gotten before it goes to the home office. This is especially 
true in a case of a disclaimer. I study them very carefully 
because we hate to disclaim, and it takes time. I have 
to send them to the home office because I am not authorized 
to disclaim on ·anything. I submit the facts and they tell 
me whether or not to discliam. 
Q. How does the interval of time that elapsed in this 
case compare to other cases? 
A. I wouldn't say .it was unduly delayed. Some take 
ionger than others. Probably a dozen people -pass on it be-
fore a disclaimer is issued. 
( Jury .returns to the Courtroom and the above evidence, · 
taken down in their absence, is read to them.) 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins:. 
Q. Mr. Pait, what is your authority to settle claims? 
A. Well, there· are supposed to be restrictions, but there 
are very few. 
Q. In ordinary accidents, you can go ahead and settle 
and pay the man off? 
A. Yes, I do that in thousands of cases. 
page 11_6r Q. You don't bother the home office about it? 
A. In serious cases, it is all submitted to the 
home office. 
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Q. In serious cases where a lot of money has to put out, 
you submit them to the home office? 
A. Well, it is a matter of principle. 
Q. In other words, your principles are that if a man's 
damages amount to about $250.00 you might pay it, but 
if a man gets a leg cut off, you had better not pay him any-
thing. 
A. No. 
Q. Money is the principle in your office? 
A. Not altogether. 
Q. You do have authority to settle these cases? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You said you sent an adjuster out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he came back on February 18 and gave you full 
idormation on the case, did he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And still, with that full information received by you 
on the 18th day of February, on the 20th day of February, 
you wrote to Mr. Kelley and told him to send all papers 
served on him in this connection to you? 
A. One of my clerks did. 
Q. One of your clerks with authority to sign your name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You say this case was not unduly delayed considering 
the fact that you denied liability. · 
A. We have never denied liability. 
page 117 ~ Q. You mean this particular policy? 
A. We denied coverage, so it is useless to go 
into the question of liability. 
Q. You are not denying liability? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You mean as to whose fault the accident was? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I mean you are denying that the Maryland Casualty 
Company is liable for this judgment? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. You are not denying liability? 
A. There is no coverage. 
Q. You are denying that you ever had a policy on this 
rar? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You never issued Kelley a policy on the car? 
A. Not on the car that was in the accident. 
Q. You are just as certain of that as you are of the 
statements you made in your letters to Kelley? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You stated in this letter, dated March 24, addressed 
to E. G. Kelley, "We have carried no policy with you at 
a.ny time covering any car used in taxi service". Is that 
true? 
A. Y es,-no policy was in force at the time that was 
written, was what I meant to say. 
Q. I am questioning what you did tell him. 
A. I have found out since I am up here, that that probably 
isn't true. 
Q. You couldn't find out in the home office 
page 118 ~or in your office that you had issued hiin a policy 
on a taxi? 
A. No. 
Q. Where could you, then? 
A. In Mr. Perry's office. I have nothing to do with that 
office, except to get coverage from Mr. Perry's records. 
Q. How far is his office from yours? 
A. About twenty feet. 
Q. Some girl sent out this card, and some letters came 
from you, without the knowledge of the Perry Corporation; 
and the Maryland Casualty Company in Baltimore doesn't 
know what any of you are doing? Is that right? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Is this statement in your letter of March 24 true? 
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A. I can tell you what I know about it. 
Q. Read the statement and tell tts whether or not it 1s 
true. 
A. So far as my knowledge goes, we had never carried 
a taxi policy on him. I looked at all the policies in force 
at the time the accident happened, and· that is as far as 
my knowledg~ goes. 
Q. (Holding policy.) I will ask you whether or not 
that is a policy issued to Kelley on a taxi cab? 
A. It probably is. I can't say. It wasn't in force when 
the accident happened. 
Q. Why did you make that statement that you had never 
i~sued him a policy on a taxi when you knew at the time 
that you did not know all the facts? 
A. I could have gone back and looked over the closed re-
cords in Mr. Perry's office. They probably have located a 
record of that policy, that old policy. 
page 1180 r Q. Without checking the policies, you make 
a definite, deliberate statement and . end it at 
that? 
A. That was my belief at the time. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
Mr. W. J. Perry, Jr. recalled to the stand. 
(Mr. Perry has left the Courtroom, so it is stipulated by 
counsel that if Mr. Perry was recalled to the stand as a 
witness, he would testify that a proper person to whom Mr. 
Kelley could have applied for a change of automobile cover-
age under the policy involved in this case, was the lqcal 
agent of the Maryland Casualty Company, at Clifton Forge, 
D. M. Grove.) 
Mr. E. G. Kelley, again recalled to the stand, testifies as 
follows: 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. Mr. Kelley, you were on the stand yesterday, I be-
lieve it was. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, since you testified, Mr. Grove has testified that 
you came to him after the accident and asked him to trans-
£ er the insurance and that you told him that you had just 
gotten the car from Roanoke. Did you mention to him 
anything about Roanoke? 
A. I might have told him I got it at Roanoke on the 31st 
day of January, and explained about it being up there at 
Wood's. I didn't tell him I got that car just a 
page 119 ~couple of days before the accident ·at Roanoke. 
Q. The Ford was traded on January 31. Short-
ly before, did you have a conversation with Mr. Grove with 
reference to trans£ erring this insurance policy to any other 
~? . 
A. I saw Mr. Grove on the street one evening. . . 
(Mr. Hunter oqjects to this question and answer as be-
ing wholly irrevelant and incompetent.) 
(Judge temporarily overrules the objection.) 
(Mr. Hunter makes the same objection to all questions 
and answers along this line of testimony.) 
(Judge overrules all the objections temporarilY:) 
A. And I told him "I have got a couple of deals on a 
car, on the car I have insured with you" ; and he said "Well, 
you have ten days to do what you please about it". He 
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said "If you get another ·car, I'll transfer it". 
·Q. In other words, as I understand you, you told Mr. 
Grove that you had a couple of deals on this car, and you 
wanted to know what to do to protect yourself, with re-
ference to this insurance policy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he told you that ·you had ten days to do what 
you wanted to, after you got your car? 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
· By Mr. Hunter: 
Q. You didn't tell Mr. Grove what kind of a car you 
exjected to get? 
page 119~ r A. No, sir, I didn't know, myself, at the 
time. 
Q.Actually you got a second-hand Dodge from the Ful-
ton Motor Company, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On January 31? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was a second-hand car?· 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Collins: 
Q. You sold that second-hand car, the Dodge? 
(Mr. Hunter objects to repitition of testimony.) 
(Mr. Collins answers that counsel for the defendant Com-
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E. G. Kelley 
pany has brought out testimony about a second-hand car, 
which is, in reality, the Dodge.) 
(Judge : "Go ahead".) 
Q. Is it the same car you have answered Mr. Hunter 
about-the same Dodge car you sold to Wood-Hammond 
Chevrolet Company? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the Ford originally covered by the policy was· 
also a second-hand car? 
A. Yes. 
Witness leaves the stand. 
Mr. Collins : The plaintiff rests its case. 
Mr. Hunter: Counsel for the defendant, moves to strike 
the plaintiff's evidence for the same reasons con-
page 120 rsigned at the conclusion of the plaintiff's testi-
mony. 
Judge Haden : Motion overruled. 
Mr. Hunter: Counsel for the defendant excepts to this 
ruling of the Court for the reasons stated when the same 
motion was overruled at the completion of the plaintiff's 
testimony. 
At this point, Court was adjourned until tomorrow mor-
ning, at 10 :00 o'clock; the Court and Counsel to consdier 
instructions in the meantime. · 
November 30, 1939: Court convened at 10 :00 o'clock. 
Jury is called to the Courtroom. 
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The following instructions ni.tmbered A-1 through D 
were given by the Court on behalf of the plaintiff and the 
defenaant, lnstruction .No. 7 bemg the plaintiff's, which are 
all of the instructions given in tne case: 
INSTRUCTION A-1 
The Court instructs the Jury · that if they believe from 
a preponderance of the evidence that Kelley . approached 
vVood, of Wood-Hammond Chevrolet ·Company, to trade 
in the Ford car named in the insurance policy for a new 
i939 Chevrolet to replace.said Ford; and if the Jury further 
believe from the evidence that said Wood offered Kelley 
only about Two Hundred Dollars for said Ford in said 
proposed trade and thereupon Kelley informed 
page 121 rWoocl that he, .Kelley, could secure a better. al-
lowance by trading in said Ford on the purchase 
of a Dodge to Fulton Motor Company of Roanoke. and that 
\Vood thereupon suggested to Kelley that if Kelley made 
such trade that then, in such event, he, Wood, could make 
Kelley a larger trade-in allowance on said Dodge than he 
could allow on said Ford; and if the Jury believe from the 
evidence that Kelley, pursuant to such suggestion from 
VVood went to Roanoke and traded in said Ford for such 
Dodge ; and if the Jury further believe from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that in making such trade said Kelley 
<lid not intend that said Dodge should replace said Ford, 
but only intended that said Dodge shoul~ remain temporari-
ly in Kelley's possession until he could trade it into Wood 
cm a new Chevrolet; and if the Jury further believe from 
the evidence that within .a few days thereafter, to-wit: on 
or about February 4th, 1939, Kelley delivered said Dodge 
to said Wood and that both parties then and there intended 
that the ownership of said Dodge should then and there 
pass to said Wood's company; and if the Jury fu·rther 'be-
Heve from the evidence that Wood's company retained sucl1 
aHeged ownership until February 13th, 1939 on which date 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clifton Toney et als. 129 
Kelley and Wood rued bargains and that Wood trans£ erred 
his company's ownership of said Dodge to Kelley on said 
date; and if the Jury further believe that wtihin ten days 
from February 13th, 1939 said Dodge was in the wreck 
which caused the plaintiff to lose his leg, and within ten 
days from February 13th, 1939 Kelley notified the Mary-
land Casualty· Company's Clifton Forge agent to change 
the policy so as to cover the Dodge, then, in such alleged 
eYent, the failure of Kelley sooner to notify the company's 
agent to change said policy so as to cover said Dodge would 
not of itself alone prevent the insurance company from be-
ing liable in this case. 
page 122 ~ INSTRUCTION A 
The court instructs the Jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the Dodge automobile was acquired by 
Kelley from the Fulton Motor Company and if the Jury 
further believe from the evidence that at that time said Kel-
ley intended then and there and immediately and without 
more, using said Dodge for the purpose of carrying pas-
sengers for compensation, then, in that event, said Dodge 
car cannot be properly classified for the purpose of use men-
tioned in the policy of· insurance, to-wit, "pleasure and busi-
ness, excluding carrying of passengers for a compensation", 
and in such alleged event there could be no liability on the 
insurance company in this case, and the Jury should find 
their vedict in fa var of the Maryland Casualty Company. 
INSTRUCTION B 
And if the Jury further believe from the evidence that 
Kelley sold said Dodge automobile to Wood-Hammond 
Chevrolet Company as defined in instruction A-1, and that 
later, to-wit, on February 13th, 1939 said Kelley acquired 
said Dodge automobile from Wood-Hammond Chevrolet 
Company and at the time Kelley. intended then and there 
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and immediately, without more, using said Dodge for the 
purpose of carrying passengers for compensation, then, in 
that event, said Dodge car cannot be properly classified for 
the purpose of use mentioned in the policy of insurance, 
to-wit, "pleasure and business, excluding carrying of pas-
~engers for a compensation", and in such alleged event there 
could be no liability on the insurance company in this case, 
and the Jury should find their verdict m 
page 123 ~favor of the Maryland Casualty Company. 
INSTRUCTION C 
The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that Kelley delivered the Dodge car to Wood-Ham-
mond Chevrolet Compa~y on or about February 4th, 1939, 
and that at the time of such delivery both parties did not in-
tend that such delivery should then and there constitute a 
sale of said Dodge car to Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Com-
pany in consideration of a new 1939 Chevrolet to be after-
wards acquired by Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company, 
but that, on the contrary, said parties, to-wit, Kelley and 
\Vood, intended to treat said transaction solely as a con-
tract for purchase, then, in that alleged event the period 
during which the car remained under the control of said 
Vvood-Hammond Chevrolet Company should be counted ~s 
a· part of the . ten day period mentioned in said policy, in 
which alleged event the Jury should find their verdict m 
favor of the defendant, Maryland Casualty Company. 
INSTRUCTION D 
The Cottrt instructs the Jury that if they believe from 
a . preponderance of the evidence that Kelley approached 
vVood, of Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company, to trade 
in the Ford car named in said insurance policy .for a new 
1939 Chevrolet to replace said Ford ; and if the Jury futher 
believe from the evidence that said Wood offered Kelley 
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only Two Hundred Dollars for said Ford in said proposed 
trade,. and that thereupon Kelley informed Wood 
page 124 rthat he, Kelley could secure a better allowance in 
trading in said Ford on the purchase price of 
a Dodge to Fulton Motor Company of Roanoke, and that 
V·il ood thereupon suggested to Kelley that if Kelley made 
such trade that then, in such event, he, Wood, could make 
Kelley a larger trade-in allowance on . said Dodge than he 
could allow on said Ford ; and if the Jury believe from the 
evidence that Kelley, pursuant to the suggestion of Wood, 
went to Roanoke and traded in said Ford for such Dodge, 
and at the time of the trade for such Dodge Kelley there-
after failed to notify the insurance company of such alleged 
replacement within ten days from the date Kelley obtained 
said Dodge, and that the wreck in question occurred from 
than ten days after Kelley had obtained possession of said 
Dodge, then, in such alleged event, the Jury should find 
their verdict in favor of the Maryland Casualty Company. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
The Court instructs the jury that the burden is upon 
the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the 
eYidence. 
After argument by counsel for both plaintiff and de-
fendant, the Jury retire to their room to consider a verdict. 
The following objections were made by coun-
page 125 ~sel for the defendant, Maryland Casualty Com-
pany, to the instructions given by the Court: 
Counsel for the defendant, Maryland Casualty Company 
objects to the granting of Instruction A-1 upon the follow-
ing grounds : 
1. The instruction is contrary to the plaintiff's own tes-
timony as it is clear from Kelley's statement that he in-
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tended that the Dodge should replace the Ford at the time 
he obtained it from Fulton Motor Company, if not perma~-
_ently, at least- for a time; and as a matter of fact, for a 
time Kelley did use the Dodge car as a replacement for 
~he Ford, and it is an error to make any conclusion as 
1"o such temporary use while the Dodge was in Kelley's 
possession after January 31, 1939. And certainly, if Kelley 
repurchased the Dodge from Wood-Hammond Chevrolet 
Company, nevertheless, on the repurchase, the Dodge re-. 
placed the the Dodge as originally used by Kelley, and 
riot the Ford described in the policy; 
2. The instruction is further erroneous in that the evi--
dence clearly shows that there could have been no sale of 
the Dodge car to Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company under 
the facts introduced in this case. To hold that such a sale 
,\~as made would be contrary to the motor vehicle statutes 
and decisions relating thereto. 
* * * 
Which objection the Court overruled, the instruction be-
ing granted, to which action of the Court, the defendant, 
Maryland Casualty Company, by counsel, excepted for the 
reasons stated in the objection 
page 126~ * * * 
Counsel for the Maryland Casualty Company 
objects to the granting of Instruction A on the following 
grounds: 
1. The instruction is erroneous as it gives cognizance 
to the use to which the Dodge automobile was actually 
put, and disregards as to what it might be classified under 
the terms of the policy; 
2. And furthermore, the instruction is erroneous in that 
;the words "immediately and without more" were improperly 
inserted therein ; 
which objection was overruled, to which action of the Court 
of overruling the said objection and giving of said· instruc-
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tion, the defendant, Maryland Casualty Company,' by counsel 
excepted, for the reasons stated in the objection. 
* * * 
Instruction B is objected to by the defendant, Maryland 
Casualty Company, by· counsel, for the same reasons stated . 
in the objection to the giving of Instruction A, and for the 
further reason that what Kelley's intentions were on Feb-
ruary 13, the day the Dodge car was redelivered to him by 
'\Vood-Hammond Chevrolet Company is entirely immaterial 
· Lecause Kelley never parted with title to said car subsequent 
to January 31, and the fact that he may or may not have 
temporarily delivered the car to Wood-Hammond Chevrolet 
Company had nothing whatever to do with the issues in this 
case; which objection was overruled, to which action of the 
Court of overruling the said objection and giving of said 
Llstruction, the defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, by 
counsel, excepted, for the reasons stated in the objection. 
* * * 
page 127 ~ Counsel for the defendant, Maryland Casualty 
Company, objects to the granting of Instruction C 
on the following grounds : the instruction disregards the 
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, prov_iding how sales 
of automobiles may be consummated, and the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia relating thereto; 
and the Court should not leave open to the jury as to whether 
or not there had been an actual sale of the Dodge by Kelley 
to the Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company, but as a mat-
ter of law, should have instructed that ~o such sale had 
ever been consummated; which objection was overruled, 
to which action of the Court of overruling the said objection 
c1.nd giving of said instruction, the defendant, Maryland 
Casualty Company, by counsel, excepted, for the reasons 
stated in the objection. 
* * * 
The defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, by counsel, 
134 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
objects to the granting of Instruction D on the ground that 
the evidence is undisputed, and Kelley did, on January 31, 
trade the Ford described in the insurance policy for the 
Dodge, and, therefore, regardless of Kelley's intention, the 
Dodge did replace said Ford as contemplated by the insurance 
policy, and the Court should not have left this question to the 
jury. It was also undisputed that Kelley failed to notify 
the insurance company oI the replacement within ten days 
of January 31, 1939, the date that Kelley obtained said 
Dodge, and for this reason, this question should not have 
been left to the decisions of the· Jury. This Instruction is 
also objected to on the same grounds relied upon by the 
defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, in sup-
page 128 rport of its motion to strike the the plaintiff's evi-
dence, which objection was overruled, to which 
action of the Court of overruling the said objection and giving 
of said instruction, the defendant, Maryland Casualty Com-
pany, by counsel, excepted, for the reasons stated in the 
objection. 
* * * 
The following instructions, requested to be given by the 
defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, by counsel, were 
refused by the Court: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from 
the evidence that the Dodge automobile was acquired by 
Kelley with the intention of using it for the purpose of carry-
ing passengers for compensation, and shortly thereafter had 
taxi signs painted thereon and otherwise equipped and pre-
pared it for use in the carrying of pass~ngers for compen-
sation, and by reason thereof the classification for the pur-
pose of use of said Dodge car was not within the classifica-
t~on for the purpose of use mentioned in the policy of insur-
ance, to-wit: "Pleasure and business, excluding the carrying 
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of passengers for a consideration", then and in that event 
no insurance coverage under the policy extended to said 
Dodge car at the time of the injury to Clifton Toney. 
page 129 r INSTRUCTION· NO. 2 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that Kelley traded the Ford automobile described 
in the policy of insurance for a Dodge automobile, and 
deliveries of both cars to the new owners were made on 
January 31, 1939, then under the terms of the policy, in-
surance on the Ford car automatically expired, and, in 
tht absence of notice to the Maryland Casualty Company, 
insurance under the policy could not be effected on said 
Dodge car beyond .ten days from January 31, 1939, to-wit: 
Febmary 10, 1939; and if you further believe from the evi-
dence that Kelley sold and delivered, within said ten days, 
said Dodge to Wood-Hammond Company, and thereafter on 
February 13, 1939, Wood-Hammond Company sold and 
delivered said Dodge car to said Kelley, then and in that 
event said Dodge car upon its said second purchase by 
said Kelley occupied the same status as if an entirely dif...: 
ferent car had been purchased and delivered to him on Feb-
ruary 13, 1939; and, said Dodge car upon its second purchase 
by Kelley did not replace the automobile described in the 
policy, to-wit: the Ford car, but replaced the Dodge car 
under the first of said purchases by Kelley; therefore, you 
are further instructed that no insurance coverage under the 
policy ever extended to and became effective upon the Dodge 
after its purchase by Kelley from Wood-Hammond Company. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
The Court instructs the jury that even though you may 
believe from a preponderance of the evidence that E. G. 
Kelley agreed to sell and Wood-Hammond Company agreed to 
buy the Dodge automobile in question at a price of 
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page 130~$550.00 and that Wood-Hammond Company paid 
to E. G. Kelley the purchase price thereof by 
giving him credit for that amount on the purchase price 
of a new Chevrolet automobile, yet, if you further believe 
from the evidence that no assignment of title to and notice 
of transfer of said automobile had been executed on the 
form prescribed by the Motor Vehicle Commissioner as 
provided by statute, and delivered by E. G. Kelley to Wood-
Hammond Company, then the contract of sale was merely 
executory and not executed, and the title to the said auto-· 
mobile never passed to Wood-Hammond Company, but re-
mained in E. G. Kelley, then in that event said Kelley was 
the owner of said automobile from January 31, 1939 to 
and including February 17, 1939, and if you further believe 
from the evidence that said Kelley did not notify the Mary-
land Casualty Company within ten days from January 31, 
1939 of the delivery of said Dodge automobile to him by 
Fulton Motor Co., Inc., any insurance under the policy 
sued on, expired on February 10, 1939, and there was no 
insurance coverage· on said Dodge automobile on February 
17, 1939, the date on which Clifton Toney was injured; and 
therefore,. your verdict should be for the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that Maryland Casualty Company issued the 
policy of insurance in question to E. G. Kelley on his Ford 
· automobile therein described, for the period beginning April 
9, 1938, and ending April 9, 1939; that said Kelley disposed 
of his ownership of said Ford automobile on Jantt:-
page 131 ~ary 31, 1939, by trading the same to Fulton Motor 
Company for a Dodge automobile which was in-
volved in the accident in which Clifton Toney was injure~ 
on February 17, 1939; that said Dodge automomible was 
delivered to said Kelley more that ten days prior to said 
injury to said Toney; that said Kelley did not notify said 
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Maryland Casualty Company within ten days after said 
l>odge automobile was delivered to him, or that Marvland 
Casualty Company did not, prior to February 17, i939,. 
hy written endorsement to beome a. part of the policy, change 
or modify said insurance policy so as to effect liability in-
surance thereunder on said Dodge automobile, then you are 
further instructed that said Toney is not entitled to recover 
anything from said Maryland Casualty Company in this 
action. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the Dodge automobile which was involved in 
the accident on February 17, 1939, in which Clifton l'0n~f,i 
was injured, was, after the policy of insurance in qri~shle~1Yl :···,... 
was issued, acquired by E. G. Kelley to be used for the car-
rying of persons for a consideration, and by reason thereof 
could not be classified for the use state4 in the policy, to-wit: 
for the purpose of "pleasure and business excluding the 
carrying of passengers for a consideration", then and in 
that event the insurance provisions of the policy with refer-
ence to newly acquired automobiles never applied to said 
Dodge automobile by reason thereof. 
page 132r INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff has no 
greater rights under the policy of insurance than E.. G. 
Kelley, and if you believe from the evidence that said Kelley 
failed to notify the Maryland Casualty Company, within ten 
days from the time the Fultqn Motor Company delivered 
to him the Dodge automobile, that he desired to transfer the 
policy of insurance from the Ford automobile to the Dodge 
automobile, and that the plaintiff's injuries were sustained 
more than ten days after the Dodge automobile was delivered 
to said Kelley, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover 
in this action. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
The Court instructs the jury that any liability insurance 
under the policy on the Ford automobile did not extend to and 
cover the Dodge automobile for more than ten days after 
the date of delivery to Kelley of the Dodge automobile un-
less said Kelley notified the company within said ten-day 
period of his ownership of said Dodge automobile and re-
quested that said policy be transferred by the company to 
said Dodge automobile; and in the absence of such notice 
and request within said ten-day period, and the payment of 
such additional premuim as may have been required, such 
insurance as may have been available to said Kelley under 
"~*he policy automatically expired. 
·•Y,:' ·t,.'" \) ~ 
:'~";~get 133 r INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
The Court instructs the jury that the declaration in the 
lJOiicy of insurance that the Ford automobile therein men-
tioned was to be used for "pleasure and business, excluding 
the carrying of passengers for a consideration" was a mater-
ial representation made by Kelley to the company; and you 
are further instructed that if you believe from the evidence 
that the Dodge automobile was acquired by Kelley to be used 
generally in the taxi business and could not thereafter reason-
ably be classified for the aforesaid purpose of use, as stated 
in the policy, then, and in that event no coverage of insurance 
extended under the policy to said Dodge automobile. 
The following exceptions to the refusal of the Court to 
grant the above instructions offered by counsel for the de-
fendant, Maryland Casualty- Company, were made by said 
defendant by said counsel: 
Counsel for the Maryland Casualty Company excepts to 
the refusal of the Court to grant Instruction No. 1, offered 
hy the Company on the following grounds : the Instruction 
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should have been given in order that the jury might have 
had the clearer and better idea as to the meaning of the 
policy relating to the classification of a car replacing that 
described . in the poky; and, further, the intention of use 
of the car replacing that described in the policy was a 
material part of the contract of insurance, and the Instruction 
clearly states the law on both subjects. 
* * * 
page 134 ~ Counsel for the Maryland Casualty Company 
excepts to the refusal of the Court to grant In-
struction No. 2, offered by the Company, on the following 
grounds: the jury should have been told that the policy 
on the Ford automobile described in the policy automati-
cally expired on January 31, 1939; and further, that in the 
absence of notice, within ten days from that date Kelley 
sold and delivered the Dodge car to Vv ood-Hammond Com-
pany, and thereafter repurchased the Dodge car, that the 
Dodge, upon its repurchase, did not replace the Ford, but 
the Dodge on its first purchase, and consequently, there was 
no insurance coverage under a sane and reasonable inter-
pretation of the policy, and to hold otherwise would be 
reading into the policy something it did not contain. 
* * * 
The defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, by counsel, 
excepts to the refusal of the Court to give Instruction No. 
3 tendered by it, on. the ground that under the laws of the 
State of Virginia before a person can pass title to an auto-
mobile to another, it is necessary that there be .an assign-
ment of the certificate of title, and also a notice of transfer 
executed on the form prescribed by the Motor Vehicle Com-
missioner. lf this was not done, the attempted alleged sale 
by Kelley to Wood-Hammond Company was ineffective, and 
since the evidence was undisputed that the Dodge was sold 
to Kelley by Fulton Motor Company on January 31, 1939, 
and since it was also undisputed that no notice of transfer 
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was given to the insurance company within ten days of 
January 31, the plaintiff, as a matter of law, is 
page 135 rnot entitled to recover; and, therefore, said In-
struction should have been given. 
* * * 
Counsel for the Maryland Casualty Company excepts to 
the refusal of the Court to grant Instruction No. 4 offered 
by the company, on the following ground: the Instruction 
covers the conditions under which insurance might have 
been available, at the election of the Company, to Kelley 
after the ten-day period, beginning on January 31, 1939, 
and clearly stated the law applicable thereto, and should have 
been given. 
* * * 
Counsel for the Maryland Casualty Company excepts to 
the refusal of the Court to grant Instruction No. 5, offered 
by the Company, on the follwing ground : that the policy 
&pecifically provides that any automobile bought by 'the 
assured to replace the automobile described in the policy 
would not be covered unless the automobile could be class-
ified for the use stated in the policy, to-wit: for the pur-
pose of "pleasure and business, excluding the carrying of 
passengers for a consideration", and certainly there was 
competent evidence from which the jury could have found 
that the car was not bought for said purpose. 
* * * 
Counsel for the Maryland Casualty Company excepts 
to the refusal of the Court to grant Instruction No. 6, 
offered by the Company, on the following grounds : the 
Instruction comes within the preview and testi-
page 136 rmony in this case, and the purpose, therefore, is 
to prevent the tacking of risks to -automobiles that 
may be purchased in replacement of automobiles described 
in the policy. In other words, it was never intended by the 
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policy, under any circumstances, to cover more than one 
car· acquire4 to replace that described in the policy, and, in 
no event, beyond ten days from the· time the first replacement 
car is delivered to the assured. 
* * *. 
The defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, by counsel, 
excepts to the refusal of the Court to give Instruction No. 
8 tendered by it on the ground that the policy specifically 
provides that there shall be no coverage thereunder for an 
automobile bought for the replacing of the automobile de-
scribed in the policy unless the Company is notified within ten 
days after the new car is delivered to the assured. 
* * * 
The defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, by counsel, 
excepts to the refusal of the Court to give Instruction No. 
9 tendered by it on the ground that the policy specifically 
stated that the purpose for which said automobile was to be 
used was "for pleasure and business, excluding the carrying 
of passengers for a consideration", and said representation 
was material to the risk. It was, therefore, proper to instruct 
the jury that there was no coverage as the use to which the 
car was generally put could not reasonably be classified under 
the above purpose. 
* * * 
page 137} And the defendant, Maryland Casualty Com-
pany, by counsel, excepts to the refusal of the 
Court to give all of the above Instructions, numbered 1, 
2, 3, 4, S, 6, 8 and 9, on the ground that they properly 
state the law as applied to the facts in this case, and on the 
further ground that the provisions therein contained are not 
covered by any other instructions given in this case. 
* * * 
The · following instruction, requested to be given by the 
plaintiff, by counsel, was refused by the Court: 
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INSTRUCTION Z 
The Court instructs the Jury that the fact that an auto-
mobile has For Hire or taxi licenses on it and taxi signs 
on it does not, of itself, make that particular car a taxi 
cab but may be considered along with other evidence, if 
any, in determining whether such car ts being used as a 
taxi cab. 
The following exception to the refusal of the Court to 
grant the above Instruction, offered by counsel for the 
plaintiff, was made by said plaintiff by said counsel: 
The plaintiff, Clifton Toney, by counsel, excepts to the 
1efusal of the Court to give Instruction Z, offered by the 
plaintiff, on the grounds that the Jury, being laymen, in 
· nature of things, will be mislead by the presence 
page 138 ~of taxi signs and taxi licenses on a car into con-
cluding that any car bearing such signs and such 
licenses is a taxi cab, thus giving to one evidentual factor 
an undue weight with the jury in the absence of an instruc-
tion such as that offered. · 
* * * 
The Court offered to give the following amended in-
struction for Instruction Z, which was declined by the plain-
tiff, by counsel, and hence not given: 
The Court instructs the Jury that the fact that an auto-
mobile has for hire and taxi licenses on it and taxi signs 
on it does not, of itself, alone, make that particular car a 
taxi cab, 'but the fact that such automobile has for hire 
or taxi licenses on it, and has taxi signs on it, may be con-
sidered along with all the other evidence in the case in deter-
mining whether or not said car was intended to be ·used 
~nd was actually used as a taxi cab. 
* * * 
The Jury returns to the Courtroom. 
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Judge: What did you gentlemen decide? 
"We, the jury, render our verdict in favor of Clifton 
Toney ~gainst the Maryland Casualty Company. 
A. J. OLIVER, JR. 
Foreman." 
page 139 ~ Judge : I will prepare the verdict in legal form, 
based upon your findings, read it to you, and ask 
you if that is the verdict you gentlemen intend to give. 
VERDICT 
"We, the jury, find that the Maryland Casualty Com .. 
pany is liable under the insurance policy introduced in this 
case, and hence we find that Maryland Casualty Company 
is indebted to E. G. Kelley and Carl Blankenship under 
said policy in the sum of $10,000.00, with interest thereon 
at the rate of 6% From April 28, 1939, and $18.60, costs 
of judgment in action of Clifton Toney v: E. G. Kelley 
and Carl Blankenship ; and hence we find our verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff, Clifton Toney v: the defendant, Mary-
land Casualty Company, in the sum of $10,000.00, with in-
terest from April 28, 1939, as aforesaid, plus $18.60, costs 
of said action of Clifton Toney v: E. G. Kelley and Carl 
Blankenship.'' 
Judge: Is that the verdict you gentlement of the jury 
wish to render? 
A. J. Oliver, Jr., foreman: Yes, sir. 
Verdict is signed by A. J. Oliver, Jr., foreman. 
* * * 
Counsel for the Maryland Casualty Company moves the 
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Court to set aside the verdict of the jury on the following 
grounds: 
1. The admission of testimony over the exceptions of the· 
Company's counsel, and the exclusion of testimony 
page 140 roffered by the Company over the objections of the 
Company's counsel, disclosed by the record, to 
the middirection of the jury, to which exceptions were duly 
taken, and the failure of the Court to grant instructions of-
fered by the Maryland Casualty Company; 
2. The refusal of the Court to strike the plaintiff's evi-
dence at the conclusion thereof on the motion of the defen-
dant, Maryland Casualty Company, for raesons stated at 
the time said motion was made; 
3. The refusal of the Court to strike the plaintiff's evi-
dence at the conclusion of all of the testimony on the motion 
of the Maryland Casualty Company for reasons stated in 
the record. 
4. The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
page 141 r Automobile Policy in manuscript record, page 
141. 
page 142r 






MR. E. G. KELLEY 
CLIFTON FORGE 
VIRGINIA 
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CLAIM NO. CLASS DATE OF ACCIDENT ADJUSTER 
58991-0-39 Automoile 2 - 17 - 39 Gentry 
ASSURED ADDRESS 
E. G. Kelley 
Injured (s) 
BI-Clifton Toney 
PD-C. r. Jordan 
BI-Chas. B. Potter 
Cli £ton Forge, Va. 
Addresses 
Hartsville, S. C. 
Hartsville, S. C 
Waynesboro, Va. 
Ul~ 
r-t- in sn ..., 
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Report of accident as above captioned was received, if any claim 
is presented kindly refer these partie.s to us as insurance carriers. 
Also if any suit papers ( summons, writs, complaints, etc.) are 
served please send them to this office immediately. 
We ask further that you incur no unauthorized expense on our 
behalf. 
NOTICE TO INSURED 
Every accident involving personal in-
. juries however slight and regardless of 
who is to blame should be ·reported 
immediately to the Claim Department 
of the Company. Do not delay because 
complet_e details are unknown. 
Registered 
No. 3362 
Staunton Claim Division 
Masonic Building 
P. 0. Box No. 208, Staunton, Va. 
Yours very truly 
A. H. Pait, Mgr. 
REGISTERED 
REGISTERED 
Return Receipt Requested 
FEE PAID 
Registered 
Mr. E. G. Kelley 
Clifton Forge, Virginia 
Receipt Requested 
REGISTERED 
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page 143~MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 
Sillman Evans, Chairman of the Board 
· Edward J. Bond, Jr., President 
STAUNTON CLAIM DIVISION 
A. H. Pait, Manager 
Masonic Building,-P. 0. Box No. 208 
Staunton, Virginia 
March 14, 1939 
File 58991-0-39-Auto 
Mr. E. G. Kelley 
Clifton Forge, Virginia 
Dear Sir: 
• I 
' -~ _J 
With reference to the accident occurring on February 17, 
1939, involving your Dodge taxi cab with a truck driven by 
Clifton Toney, wish to state that we have investigated and 
find that this Company has no coverage for the car involved 
in this accident, and it is necessary, therefore, for us to dis-
claim coverage of any nature on the car involved in this 
accident. In view of the above we will not be in position 
to protect your interests should claim be made or suit in-
stituted. 
We would be glad to have you acknowledge receipt of 
this letter advising whether or not you agree with us. 
Should you disagree it is our present intention to institute 
proceedings for a declaratory judgment in the Federal Courts 
in order that the question of coverage may be definitely 
determined. 
ahp/in 
cc-Mr. Grove, Agent 
cc-Claim Division 
1898 





Forty Years Insurance Service to American Business 
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page 144~ 
A. H. Pait, Manager 




Clifton Forge, Virginia 
March 17th, 1939. 
I received your letter of March 15th. ~nd am very much 
surprised about your statement that there was no insurance 
covering the accident. I will appreciate it very much if 
yom" will advise me for what reasons you claim there was 
no msurance because the premuim was paid when I got 
the policy. 
Very truly yours, 
Kelley Exhibit D. 
page 145~MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 
Sillman Evans, Chairman of the Board 
Edward J. Bond Jr., President 
Staunton Claim Division 
A. H. Pait, Manager 
Masonic 1Building-P. 0. Box No. 208 
Staunton, Virgina March 24, 1939 
Mr. E. G. Kelley 
Clifton Forge, Virginia 
Dear Sir: 
We have noted yours of March 17 in answer to ours of 
March 14 in connection with coverage for the accident of 
Feruary 17. You are asking me to advise what reasons 
we have for claiming there was no insurance. We have 
never had a policy on the car involved in this accident, and we 
are therefore at a loss to understapd why it was reported 
148 Supreme Co~rt of Appeals of Virginia . 
to us in the first place. · We have carried no policy with 
you at any time covering any car used in taxi service, and 
our investigation shows that you have secured no regis-
tration card from the Division of Motor Vehicles on · a pri-
vately owned ~ar, and further that the Ford which we 
originially covered for private use was used as a taxi and 
· there was, therefore, no coverage for that car which we 
understand was traded in several weeks before this accident, 
and without' notice to this Company: 
We trust this explains the situation to your entire satis-
faction . 
Yours truly, 
A. H. PAIT, Mgr. 
AHP:ra 
Kelley Exhibit E. 
1898 1938 
Forty Years Insurance Service to American Business 





Maryland Casualty Company Jncorpo~ated 1898 
Staunton Claims Division 
Masonic Building 
· P. 0. Box 208 Staunton, Va. 
Mr. E. G. Kelley, 
Clifton Forge, Virginia 
page 146~RECEIPT FOR REGISTERED ARTICLE 
NO. 799 
15 fee paid. 1 class potsage paid. March 30, 1939 
Declared value $. . . . . . Surcharge paid, $ ..... . 
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From E. G. Kelley 
(sender) 
City 
Clifton Forge, Va. 
Mar 




Addressed to Maryland Casualty Co. 
(addressee) 
...................... ~ . . . . . Baltimore, Md. 
( St. and Number) (Post office and state) 
Accepting employee will place initials in space below, in-
dicating restricted delivery. 
Return receipt fee 3 in person Special delivery fee 
or order 
Delivery restricted to addressee Fee ·paid Postmaster, 
per E.P.G. 
page 147~ Clifton Forge, Virginia 
March· 30th, 1939. · 
Maryland Casualty Co. 
Baltimore, Maryland 
Gentlemen:-
U nder policy No. 15-660950 issued to me I hand you 
herewith notice of motion which has been today served on 
me by the Sergeant of the City of· Clifton Forge, Virginia . 
Very truly yours, 
Kelley Exhibit F. 
page _148~ 
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Dealer's Name Wood-Hammond 
Address Clifton Forge, Va. 
Purchaser's Name E. G. Kelley 
Salesman's Name, H. C. Wood Date 2-4-39 
Please enter my Order for 1 New DeLuxe 39 Car 
Quantity Make & Year 
C. S. E.D. Mode] Body Style .................. . 
Color, Black To be delivered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .. . 
or Moss Gray 
Cash Delivered Price of Car $868.00 
DeLuxe Equipment ................................. . 
Dealer agrees to pay $200.00 contract with Commercial 
Credit 
License, License Transfer, Title, Registration Fee ........ . 
Insurance ......................................... . 
'1'otal Price ........................................ . 
Deposit ........................................... . 
Used Car Allow $550.00 Bal. owed $200. Net Allow. $350.00 
Make of Used Car ........ Body Style ....... Year ..... . 
Serial No. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Engine No. . ............... . 
Balance of down payment, due on delivery ............. . 
Net Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... . 
Total Balance, due delivery .......................... . 
Bal. to be paid in ...... monthly installments of ...... each 
Special Instructions G. M. A. C. 
I have read the matter printed on the back hereof and 
agree to it as a part of this order the same as if it were 
printed above my signature. The front and back of this 
order comply the entire agreement affecting this purchase 
and no other agreement or understanding of any nature con-
cerning same has been made, or entered into, or will be 
recognized. 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this order. 
T'his order is not_ binding until accepted by dealer. 
Buyer's signature: E. G. Kelley 
.\ddress ........................................... . 
Accepted by, Wood-Hammond, dealer 
By H. C. Wood, owner, Title 
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Endorsement on foregoing Order 
It is further understood and agreed ; 
The order on the reverse side hereof is subject to the fol-
lowing terms and conditions which have been mutually 
agreed upon; 
1. Chevrolet Motor Division-General Motor Sales 
Corporation, has reserved the right to change the list price 
of a new Chevrolet motor vehicle, without notice and in 
the event that the list price of the new car ordered here-
under is so changed, the cash delivered price, which is based 
on list price, effective on the day of delivery, will govern 
in this transaction, but if such cash delivered price is in-
creased, the purchaser may, if dissatisfied with 
page 149 rsuch increase price, cancell this order, in which 
event if a used car has been. traded in as a part 
of the consideration herein, such used car shall be returned 
to the purchaser upon the payment of a reasonable charge 
for storage and repairs ( if any) or, if the used car has 
been previously sold by the dealer, the amount received 
therefor less a selling commission of 15 % and any ex-
pense incurred in storing, insuring, conditioning, or advertis-
ing said car for sale shall be returned to the purchaser. 
· 2. If the used car is not to be delivered to the dealer un-
til the delivery of the new car, the used car shall be re-ap-
praised at that time and such re-appraisal value shall deter-
mine the allowance made for such used car. The purchaser 
agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any 
used car traded herein along with the delivery of such used 
car, and the purchaser warrants such used car to be his 
property free and clear of all liens and incumbrances ex-
cept as otherwise noted herein. 
3. In the event the purchaser fails or refuses to take 
delivery of the car ordered herein except in the case of can-
cellation on account of increase of list pri_ce, the deposit or 
down payment herein may be retained as liquidated da-
mages to cover dealer's expense and loss, and the dealer 
152 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
may dispose of the car so ordered without any liability to 
the purchaser whatsoever. 
4. Chevrolet Motor Division-General Motor Sales Cor-
poration has the right to make any changes in the model 
or design of any accessory and part of any new Chevrolet 
Motor vehicle at any time without creating any obligation 
on the part of either the dealer or Chevrolet Motor Division 
--General Motors Sales Corporation to make corresponding · 
changes in the car covered by this order either before or 
subsequent to the delivery of such car to the pur.chaser. 
5. Dealer shall not be liable for delays caused by the 
manufacturer, accidents, strikes, fires, or other causes be-
yond the control of the dealer. 
6. The price quoted herein does not include any tax or 
taxes imposed by any governmental authority at the time 
of delivery of such car unless expressly so stated. 
7. The legal title to said car shall not pass until pay-
ment therefor is received in full as herein provided. 
8. It is expressly .agreed that there are no warranties, 
e::xpressed or implied, made by either the dealer or the manu-
facturer on the Chevrolet Motor Vehicle, chasis, or parts 
furnished hereunder, except as follows ; 
"The manufacturer warrants each new Motor vehicle 
( including original equipment placed thereon by the manu-
facturor except tires), chasis or part manufactured by it 
to be free from defects in material or workmanship, under 
normal use and service. I ts obligations under this warranty 
heing limited to making goods at its factory any part or 
parts thereof, which shall, within ninety (90) days after 
delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser or before 
such vehicle has been driven four thousand miles, which ever 
event shall first occur, be returned to it with transportation 
charges prepaid, and which its examination shall disclose to 
its satisfaction to have been thus defective; this warranty 
being expressly in lieu of all other warranties, expressed 
or implied, and all other obligations or liabilities on its part, 
and it neither assumes or authorizes any other person to 
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assume for it any other liability in connection with the sale 
of its vehicles. This warranty shall not apply to any ve-
hicle which shall have been repaired or altered 
page 150 routside of an authod.zed Chevrolet Service Station 
in any way so as in the judgment of the manu-
facturer to affect its stability and reliabilty, nor which has 
been subject to mis-use, negligence or accident." 
The dealer agrees to install any part or parts furnished 
under the manufacturer's warranty above on the motor 
vehicle covered in this order, without charge to the owner 
of such motor vehicle. 
This ~arranty does not apply to second-hand car or cars 
not mentioned in the above order. 
The dealer also agrees to properly perform ~nd fulfill all 
terms and· condition of the owner service policy. 
The above comprises the entire agreement affecting this 
purchase, and no other agreement or understanding of any 
nature concerning same has been made or entered into, or 
will be recognized. 
page 151 r Name 
Address 
Town Kelley Car 
Date 2-9 Do not write here 
Mileage No 1379 
Phone Make Dodge Sedan Cust. 
Order No. 
Model Serial No. Motor No. License No. 
Needed Hub ( ) Lens ( ) Bulbs ( ) Glass ( ) 
Replace- Cap 
l\fents Hard-( ) Fenders ( ) Tires & 
ware Run. Board ( ) Accessories ( ) 
Needed Body ( ) Run Board ( ) Top ( ) 
Fenders ( ) Duco Touch-up ( ) 
H.epairs Front Axle 
& Wheels ( ) Brakes ( ) Mechanical ( ) 
Instruction for Work Actually ordered Amount of 
Charges 
Estimates for Labor only-Material Additional 
Oper. Lubrkate( ) Change oil ( ) Flush Trans. ( ) 
154 Supreme Court of App~als of Virginia 
Di:ff. ( ) 
No. Had ( ) 
Wash ( ) Polish ( ) Service Agree. 
sold ( ) 
Wash & Polish 
Grease 
Check Battery 











\iVHERE CAN WE SELL A NEW OR USED CAR? 
Now Parts 
N Al\lIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Owns ......... . 
Accesories 
1\DDRESS ........................... . 
Oil & Grease 
It is understood ( and agreed) that this 
Company assumed no responsibility for loss Sublet Repairs 
or damage occasioned by fire, the£ t, dem-
onstration or while road testing deliver- Tax 
ing and/or calling for any vehicle placed 
with this Company for storage, sale, repair Total 3.00 
or otherwise. 
Wood Exhibit 
Authorized By ........................... . 
Printed by the Standard Register Co., Dayton, Ohio, U.S.A. 
page 152 r The endorsement on the foregoing list of repairs 
Parts 
Quan. 
is as follows : 
Repair Order No. . ...... . 
_Part No. . . Description Acctg. Prke Amount 
Phone Call 65 
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Oil & Grease Total Parts xx xx 
Accessories Total Oil & Grease xx xx 
Total Accessories xx xx 
Sublet Repairs 
Description Req.No. Price Acctg. 
page 153 ~ February 24, 1939 
H. C. Wood, Clifton Forge, Va. 
Partner of Wood-Hammond Chevrolet Company of Clif-
ton Forge. 
Concerning a transaction with E. G. Kelley of Clifton 
Forge we agreed to· allow Mr. Kelley $550.00 for a 1937 
Dodge Sedan on the purchase of a new Chevrolet, delivery 
to be made in April, 1939 or about the first of April. This 
contract was made on February 4, 1939. 
On February 9, 1939. we did some repair work on the 
car, washing and polishing it. The car was delivered to 
us on February 4, 1939, the date on the order. Later Mr. 
Kelley decided that he was not going through with the 
trade and asked for his Dodge back. 
He paid the repair bill of $3.00 and the Dodge· was deliv-
ered back to Mr. Kelley on February 13, 1939. 
At the time Mr. Kelley came for his car, he called his 
office and told one of his drivers to bring license tags up to 
our place of business to put on the Dodge. I am not posi-
tive but I believe that the tags which were put on the Dodge 
were "H" or taxi tags. I could not say this under oath 
156 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
but my best recollection of the matter makes me think that 
'.'H" tags were put on the Dodge before it was driven out 
_of our garage. · 
· -It was no fault of the Wood-Hammond Company that 
j\fr. KelJey backed down on his contract. We were going 
to make delivery of the new car on about April 1, as per 
our agreement -but Mr. Kelley cancalled the order. Con-
cerning the delivery date to us of the Dodge Car by Mr. 
Kelley, I think it was several days after the order of Feb. 
4, 1939 was given that Mr. Kelley delivered the car to 
us. 
page 154 r I had a prospect for the car and I didn't want 
Mr.· Kelley to drive it around in taxi serivce. I 
saw him a couple of times about this and about February 
i, 1939 one of his men brought the car to us. 
When he brought the Dodge to our garage for us to 
look it over, it had "H" tags on it. I have seen the Dodge 
setting in front of Mr. Kelley's place of business but I. do 
_ not recall seeing any passengers in the Dodge. 
(Signed) 
Wood Exhibit 
H. C. WOOD 
page 155 r We the jury render our verdict in favor of 
Clifton Toney against the Maryland Casualty Co. · 
A. J. OLIVER, JR., Foreman 
page ·156r I, Earl L. Abbott, Judge of the Circuit Court 
·of the County of Alleghany, Virginia, who was 
appointed as such after the trial of this case, but before 
judgment was rendered therein, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true and correct stenographic copy or re-
port of all the testimony that was introduced, and other 
incidents of the trial therein, including all the instructions 
given, amended or refused, all exhibits or other writings 
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introduced in evidence or presented to the trial court, all 
questions raised and all rulings thereon, in the case of Clif-
ton Toney v. E. G.· Kelley, Carl Blankenship, and Maryland 
Casualty Company, tried in the Circut Court of Alleghany 
County, Virginia, on the 28th, 29th, and 30th days of 
November, 1939, and it appe~rs in wri~ing that, the plain-
tiff's attorneys have had reasonable notice of the time and 
place when this report of the testimony and other incidents 
of trial will be tendered and presented to the undersigned 
for certification, which is certified within sixty days after 
final judgment. 
Given under my hand this the 26th day of August, 1940. 
EARLL. ABBOTT 
Judge 
page 157r CERTIFICA'J'E OF CLERK 
I, Olin J. Payne, Clerk of the Circuit Court for the Coun-
ty of Alleghany, Virginia, do hereby certify that the fore-
going stenographic copy or report of testimony, and other 
incidents of the trial of the case of Clifton Toney v. E. G. 
Kelley, Carl Blankenship and Maryland Casualty Com-
pany, was filed with me as Clerk of said Court on the 26th 
day of August, 1940. 
OLIN J. PAYNE 
Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
Virginia, 
Alleghany County. 
I, Olin J. Payne, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Coun-
ty of Alleghany, State of Virginia, do herey certify that 
the foregoing is a true transcript of the record and proceed-
ings in a certain action at law lately pending in said Court 
under the style of Clifton Toney, plaintiff, v. E. G. Kel-
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]ey, Carl Blankenship and Maryland Casualty Company, 
defendants, and that said transcript 0.f the record was made 
up and certified by me after notice to the plaintiff's attorney, 
as required by Section 6339 of the Code of Virginia. 
Given under my hand this 5th day of September, 1940. 
Evidence $120.00 
Clerk fee $15.00 
Total $135.00 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
OLIN J. PAYNE, Clerk 
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